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The Automatic Fiscal 
Stabilizers: Quietly Doing 
Their Thing
I. Introduction
he cyclical nature of the U.S. economy has undergone 
profound changes over the past century. As carefully 
documented by Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) and Romer 
(1999), since World War II, recessions have become less 
frequent and business expansions have become substantially 
longer. In addition, Romer argues that recessions are now less 
severe: Output loss during recessions is about 6 percent smaller 
on average in the post–World War II period than in the thirty-
year period prior to World War I and substantially smaller than 
in the 1920 to 1940 interwar period. Furthermore, the variance 
of output growth has declined as well. Romer attributes these 
changes largely to the rise of macroeconomic policy after 
World War II; in particular, she argues that the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers—including the income-based tax system and 
unemployment insurance benefits—have played a prominent 
role in converting some periods of likely recession into periods 
of normal growth as well as in boosting growth in the first year 
following recession troughs. Given the Keynesian-style models 
used by Romer to support her claims, one would expect that 
personal consumption also would have been stabilized since 
World War II. Indeed, Basu and Taylor (1999) present 
evidence that the volatility of aggregate U.S. consumption has 
declined in the postwar period.
This paper presents theoretical and empirical analysis of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers. Using the modern theory of 
consumption behavior, we identify several channels through 
which optimal reaction of household consumption plans to 
aggregate income shocks is tempered by these stabilizers. Such 
automatic stabilization occurs even when households have full 
understanding of the constraints on their behavior implied by 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint and have 
full awareness of the difference between aggregate and 
idiosyncratic shocks to their labor income. This does not 
necessarily imply that the current fiscal stabilizers in the United 
States are set at optimal levels. The analysis of optimal tax rates, 
for example, is the subject of a large literature that involves 
comparing the benefits and costs of different settings and 
would take us well beyond the scope of this paper. 
Moreover, our theoretical findings raise the issue of whether 
the insurance, wealth, and liquidity effects of the income tax 
system that we identify are realistic channels through which the 
effects of income shocks are stabilized. Furthermore, there is 
the issue of whether these channels are more or less empirically 
important than the wealth channel identified in earlier work, a 
channel whose effect requires that households have incomplete 
information about the nature of income shocks. We believe 
that these remain important open issues, although we would 
not be surprised if elements from each channel eventually were 
found to be empirically meaningful.
However, in an attempt to bring at least some evidence to 
bear on these issues, we present results from several empirical 
exercises using postwar U.S. data. Using standard time-domain 
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techniques, we estimate elasticities of the various federal taxes 
with respect to their tax bases and responses of certain 
components of federal spending to changes in the 
unemployment rate. Using frequency-domain techniques, we 
confirm that the relationships found in the time domain are 
strong at the business-cycle frequencies. Together, these results 
showing strong ties between cyclical variation in income and 
federal government spending and taxes suggest the potential 
for the automatic fiscal stabilizers to play a quantitatively 
important role in the economic stabilization process.
Using the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US quarterly 
econometric model, however, we find that the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers play a rather limited role in damping the short-run 
effect of aggregate demand shocks on real GDP, reducing the 
“multiplier” by about 10 percent, although they have a 
somewhat larger damping impact (in percentage terms) on 
personal consumption expenditures. Very little stabilization is 
provided in the case of an aggregate supply shock. 
Before turning to the details of our analysis, it is worth 
mentioning the startling result developed by Lucas (1987). In 
the context of a standard model of an optimizing representative 
consumer, Lucas argues that perfect stabilization—that is, 
complete elimination of the variance of consumption in the 
United States—would yield virtually no utility gain to 
households both in absolute terms and relative to the huge 
utility gain associated with only a modest increase in the 
growth rate of consumption. Moreover, much of the 
subsequent literature has supported the robustness of this 
result. As such, this finding calls into question the act of 
devoting resources to the study (as well as to the practice) of 
stabilization policy.
While a complete response is well beyond the scope of this 
paper, we would make the following brief points. First, national 
election outcomes and, indeed, the very cohesiveness of 
societies appear to depend on the state of the business cycle; 
such factors generally are not captured in the standard utility-
maximizing framework. Second, cyclical downturns have a 
negative and, quite possibly, sizable impact on a minority of the 
work force; thus, stabilization policy may generate a large 
welfare gain even if the gain averaged across the entire 
population is small.1 Third, business-cycle variation and long-
term growth (or the mean level of consumption) may not be 
completely independent, as assumed by Lucas; for example, the 
loss of human capital associated with job loss during a cyclical 
downturn might have long-lasting impacts. Fourth, the Lucas 
result depends partly on the actual variance of U.S. 
consumption over the post–World War II period, a variance 
that has declined relative to the prewar period to a fairly low 
level. If this outcome has resulted largely from macroeconomic 
stabilization policy, as argued by Romer (1999), then 
elimination of stabilization policy might cause a large enough 
increase in aggregate consumption variance to alter the Lucas 
result. 
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. The next 
section offers three theoretical arguments for the effectiveness 
of automatic stabilizers; each is formally developed as a 
variation on the same underlying consumer optimization 
problem. While these modeling exercises, as well as a brief 
analysis of firms’ investment demand, are carried out in a 
partial equilibrium context, there will be some discussion of 
general equilibrium issues as well. Section III reports 
simulations of the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US quarterly 
econometric model. Section IV analyzes the business-cycle 
relationship between income and certain federal government 
taxes and spending using frequency-domain techniques. 
Section V presents a complete reestimation of the high-
employment budget model used by staff at the Federal Reserve 
Board and the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the 
past twenty years. Section VI concludes.
II. The Analytics of Automatic
Fiscal Stabilizers
A. Review of the Literature
This section examines theoretically the role of automatic fiscal 
stabilizers—in particular, the income tax—in modifying the 
response of consumption to income shocks. Perhaps 
surprisingly, there has been very little written on this subject in 
the academic literature since the mid-1980s, despite numerous 
legislative changes in individual income tax rates beginning 
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986.2 We will briefly discuss 
earlier work on the role of automatic stabilizers, drawing on the 
excellent summary in Blinder and Solow (1974) in the context 
of the basic Keynesian model and on the seminal work in 
Christiano (1984) showing the possibility that the automatic 
stabilizers could work using an explicit framework of an 
optimizing consumer facing uncertain income prospects.3 
We then present new models of the effects of the income tax on 
optimizing consumers that we feel are a move toward greater 
realism. In contrast to the earlier Keynesian tradition, our 
models are not full general equilibrium exercises. However, we 
would argue that the consumer’s decision problem must be 
central to any sensible analysis of the role of automatic 
stabilizers and, at the end of the section, we conjecture that 
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the results of the partial equilibrium analysis. At the end of the 
section, we also briefly discuss the relationship between 
investment demand and the automatic stabilizers.
The basic idea of the textbook Keynesian model is that the 
impact on aggregate current consumption and output of an 
exogenous shock to aggregate demand, for example, is 
mitigated by the automatic stabilizers, which damp any effect 
of the shock on current personal disposable income. By 
evaluating the multiplier (the impact of an exogenous change 
in aggregate demand on output) for positive and zero values of 
the income tax rate, one can show that automatic stabilizers 
reduce the multiplier by  , 
where   denotes the marginal propensity to consume out of 
after-tax income,   denotes the marginal income tax rate, and 
 is a term that captures the crowding-out effect of higher 
interest rates and prices on aggregate demand.4 A key 
assumption underlying such results is that current—rather 
than permanent or lifetime—personal income and taxes are 
the only determinants of consumption demand.5
These Keynesian results are seemingly at odds with the 
predictions of the basic life-cycle permanent income models of 
consumer behavior with no government (Deaton 1992). Under 
several simplifying assumptions—including quadratic utility, 
equality of the interest rate and rate of time preference, and 
lack of borrowing constraints—those models suggest the 
feasibility and optimality of constant consumption throughout 
the life cycle. If a household’s labor income is anticipated to rise 
over time, for example, then the household simply would 
borrow to support consumption in excess of labor income 
early in the life cycle. Furthermore, unanticipated changes in a 
household’s income—for example, owing to temporary 
changes associated with the business cycle—would alter the 
level of the desired consumption path but not its slope. 
Moreover, the impact on the level of consumption would not 
be mitigated in the presence of an income tax provided that the 
change in income taxes (induced by the business-cycle shock to 
income) was offset by a change in future taxes necessary to keep 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint in balance, 
because the present value of household lifetime tax liabilities 
would be unchanged. How, then, can policies—in particular, 
government taxes and spending—help to stabilize household 
consumption when households optimally should be doing the 
stabilizing themselves?
Christiano (1984) appears to be the first to find a role for the 
automatic tax stabilizers in the context of an optimizing 
consumer choice problem. In his two-period model, 
consumers maximize expected utility; specifically, a constant 
absolute risk-aversion utility function of consumption in each 
period (but not leisure) is used. Labor income is uncertain in 
the first period owing to the possibility of both common 




(aggregate) and idiosyncratic shocks that are normally 
distributed, while labor income in the second period is certain. 
There is an income tax on wages in the first period and lump-
sum taxes in the second period, which rules out the possibility 
that the income tax can play an insurance role (even if second-
period wage income was uncertain). Also, any change in 
aggregate income taxes in the first period is offset by an equal 
present value increase in taxes in the second period. Borrowing 
is allowed by individuals and the government, and the interest 
rate is tied down by a storage technology.
Christiano first considers the full information case in which 
households are able to distinguish between the aggregate and 
idiosyncratic income shocks. In this case, the automatic 
income tax stabilizer has no effect on the positive correlation 
between aggregate income shocks and consumption, because 
there is no insurance effect provided by the tax structure and 
because there is no wealth effect, as the present value of tax 
payments is unchanged by assumption. However, the positive 
correlation between individual consumption and idiosyncratic 
income shocks is reduced by the presence of an income tax. 
This arises because the income shock has an imperceptible 
effect on aggregate taxes in both periods but does alter an 
individual’s tax bill, thereby providing an offsetting wealth 
effect. In the case of incomplete information, households 
respond to a common shock as though it were partly 
idiosyncratic; based on the results in the full information case, 
the more the shock is perceived as being idiosyncratic, the more 
the income tax will serve as an automatic stabilizer. 
The new analysis of automatic tax stabilizers developed 
below builds on the work of Christiano as well as that of Chan 
(1983) and Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986), although the 
latter two do not consider automatic stabilizers. The basic 
framework of these three papers is remarkably similar. All 
develop two-period models of optimizing representative 
agents facing labor income uncertainty and a government 
intertemporal budget constraint that requires second-period 
taxes to adjust to maintain balance. Labor supply is fixed, and 
each allows for precautionary saving (a positive third derivative 
of the utility function). However, there are some interesting 
differences. For example, Christiano assumes that in period 
one there is labor income uncertainty and an income tax, but 
in period two there is no uncertainty and a lump-sum tax. By 
contrast, Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes assume that in period 
one there is a lump-sum tax and no income uncertainty, while 
in period two there is an income tax and idiosyncratic income 
uncertainty.
Chan makes the same assumptions as Barsky, Mankiw, and 
Zeldes about labor income uncertainty; however, in his 
benchmark model, second-period lump-sum taxes are 
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in period two are known with certainty). He further assumes 
that a tax cut in period one is accompanied not only by higher 
taxes in period two (to maintain the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint) but by an increase in the 
cross-sectional randomness of tax shares as well. This 
additional randomness is understood by households who 
accordingly increase their precautionary saving or reduce first-
period consumption; that is, the tax cut reduces consumption. 
We do not incorporate the uncertainty about future tax shares 
below because it is not clear that a current tax cut should 
necessarily raise future income uncertainty. There is always 
uncertainty about who will pay (and how much) in future taxes 
even without a current tax cut. For example, even if the budget 
is always balanced, there can be future revenue-neutral tax 
reforms that change the distribution of tax burdens.
B. New Results—Approach 1
Our first approach adopts the core two-period optimizing 
framework of the above models. In particular, we assume that 
there is future idiosyncratic labor income uncertainty and the 
absence of private insurance and financial instruments that can 
provide complete insurance. Moral hazard and anti-slavery 
laws often are cited as underlying reasons for the inability of 
individuals to privately diversify away labor income risk. We 
differ from the above models by assuming—perhaps more 
realistically—that there is an income tax in both periods; this 
allows an income shock in the first period automatically to 
affect taxes in the first period and hence the income tax rate in 
the second period. It is through this channel that the automatic 
stabilizers work. The idea is that the income tax provides 
insurance against otherwise uninsurable future uncertain 
variation in labor income, because a higher income tax rate 
reduces the variance of future after-tax income (for a given 
variance of before-tax income); as a result, the higher tax rate 
lowers precautionary saving or increases current consumption.
In the model, each individual  maximizes 
expected utility:
(1)  ,
where   denotes private consumption in period  ;   
denotes government consumption in period  ; and   is the 
expectations operator conditional on information available in 
the first period. We assume that  ,  , and  . 
Derivatives with respect to   will be discussed below. In our 
first model, government consumption expenditures are fixed 
in both periods.
Each person (assumed identical) has labor income,  , in 
period : 
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where   denotes certain endowment labor income in period 
, assumed the same for each individual; and   denotes the 
idiosyncratic shock in period  , has zero mean, and is 
uncorrelated across individuals. We analyze the effects of 
unanticipated changes to each individual’s endowment income 
and, in this sense, our approach is similar to the one in Barsky, 
Mankiw, and Zeldes.
There is a proportional tax on labor income in each period, 
where   denotes the tax rate in period  .  Individuals save by 
holding government bonds, which pay a gross return of 
, where   is the risk-free interest rate).6 Note that 
there is no tax on interest income, an issue to which we return 
below. Also note that labor is supplied inelastically. At the end 
of the first period, the wealth of each individual,  , is given by:
(3)  .
Consumption of each individual in the second period is:
(4) .
Aggregate tax revenue in period    is denoted by  . Thus, 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (assuming 
zero initial government debt) is:
(5)  .
But aggregate taxes in period   simplify to:
(6) , 
since  , and the summations are taken over  . Also, 
 denotes aggregate endowment labor income in period  ; 
because all   individuals are assumed identical,  . 
Thus, the income tax rate in period   faced by individuals is 
. Because equation 5 implies that aggregate taxes 
in period two depend on taxes in period one, the tax rate in 
period two depends on   and hence on the tax rate in period 
one:
(7) .
In analyzing this model, we adopt an approach similar to 
that in Chan (1983) and in Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986). 
Consumers maximize expected utility (equation 1) subject to 
equations 2-7. Now, suppose that a recession, for example, 
causes a temporary (that is, period-one) shock to endowment 
income,  , of all individuals. Differentiation of the first-order 




The first term on the right-hand side of equation 8 is the 
positive “wealth effect” associated with an unanticipated 
increase in before-tax labor income. Note that because higher 
first-period income taxes are exactly offset in present value 
terms by lower second-period income taxes, there is no impact 
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of taxes on the wealth effect. The second term represents the 
offsetting negative effect on consumption owing to higher 
precautionary saving: higher aggregate first-period income tax 
receipts imply a lower second-period income tax rate and thus 
less insurance against idiosyncratic income shocks. As shown 
in Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes, the precautionary saving effect 
requires that   be positive (so that the covariance 
term in equation 8 is positive). We assume that the wealth 
effect dominates the precautionary saving effect and hence that 
a positive (negative) increment to labor income boosts 
(reduces) first-period consumption. Differentiation of 
equation 8 with respect to   establishes that a stronger 
automatic stabilizer (that is, a larger  ) reduces the positive 
impact of a temporary income shock on first-period 
consumption—that is, it establishes that  ; 
it does so by strengthening the precautionary saving effect. 
Before moving on to our next models, we briefly discuss the 
assumption made here and in the prior literature: that interest 
income is not taxable. The introduction of interest income 
taxation into our model would tend to strengthen the above 
results regarding automatic stabilizers for two reasons. First, 
higher before-tax income in period one would lead to a 
reduction in the income tax rate in period two for the same 
reason as before, and because the second-period tax base is 
larger (higher labor income boosts first-period saving and 
hence interest income subject to tax in the second period) and 
total second-period tax receipts are determined completely by 
first-period taxes and government spending. The resulting 
lower income tax rate in period two further strengthens 
precautionary saving. Second, a lower second-period tax rate 
boosts the after-tax interest rate, for a given before-tax rate, 
which further increases the incentive to save (if the substitution 
effect exceeds the income effect).
C. New Results—Approach 2
We now modify the model to allow a change in income taxes 
induced by a temporary income shock to be matched by a 
change in government consumption spending; both are 
assumed to occur in the first period. It is thus useful to rewrite 
equation 7 as follows:
(9) .
In addition, it is assumed that private and government 
consumption expenditures are directly substitutable (although 
not necessarily perfect substitutes) within periods; that is,   
is a substitute for   but not for  , and similarly for  . 
Thus, for the utility function in equation 1—that is, for 
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hence only the conditions   and   are relevant.7 
To evaluate the effect of a shock to the first-period endowment 




where   is defined above.
The first term on the right-hand side of equation 10, which 
is positive, represents the “wealth effect” of higher after-tax 
labor income; before-tax labor income is higher, but this is 
partially offset by higher income taxes in the first period. This 
offset, owing to the automatic stabilizers (that is, the income 
tax), is reinforced by the second term on the right-hand side of 
equation 10. The latter term, which is negative, represents the 
direct substitution effect of higher government consumption 
spending (owing to higher income taxes) on private 
consumption. We assume that the wealth effect dominates the 
direct substitution effect and hence  . 
Differentiation of equation 10 with respect to   establishes 
that a stronger automatic stabilizer (that is, a higher  ) 
weakens the positive impact of a temporary shock to before-tax 
labor income, that is, it establishes that  .
D. New Results—Approach 3
In the final variant of our model, we introduce explicit 
constraints on borrowing by households following the 
approach in Chan (1983). We assume that borrowing cannot 
exceed a fixed fraction of current after-tax labor income and, 
for simplicity, that  . If   denotes household lending 
 or borrowing  , the constraint can be written as:
(11) , 
where   is some fixed, positive number. For example, if   
and if the constraint is binding in the sense that household 
borrowing equals after-tax income, then first-period 
consumption is double after-tax income (that is, the sum of 
disposable income and the borrowed amount, also equal to 
disposable income). Such a constraint is consistent with home 
mortgage payment rules-of-thumb in which monthly interest 
payments cannot exceed a fixed fraction of income. The 
possibility of borrowing or liquidity constraints is appealing, 
especially in light of recent empirical work, such as that of 
Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999), which finds that individual 
consumption rises when fully anticipated increases in after-tax 
income are realized. 
The rest of the model is the same as in Section II B, in which 
future income taxes are assumed to adjust to maintain the 
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government’s intertemporal budget constraint (and in which 
 is replaced by   in equations 3 and 4). We consider 
households for whom the borrowing constraint (equation 11) 
is binding. For such individuals, the model solution for first-
period consumption follows immediately, as in the example 
above, because the borrowing constraint (along with current 
after-tax labor income) completely determines first-period 
consumption. It follows that a higher income tax rate—that is, 
stronger automatic stabilizers—reduces first-period 
consumption and hence reduces the effect of a labor income 
shock on first-period consumption. With an adverse shock to 
labor income, for example, private borrowing is reduced but, 
because income taxes decline, government borrowing is 
increased. As noted by Chan (1983) in a related problem, the 
government—which is not subject to a borrowing constraint—
is effectively borrowing on households’ behalf, thereby 
circumventing the household limit.
E. Investment and General Equilibrium 
Considerations
We now address some loose ends in the prior analysis. We 
begin with a discussion of the relationship between investment 
demand and the automatic stabilizers in a partial equilibrium, 
optimizing framework. We then discuss general equilibrium 
issues, offering several conjectures but not the development of 
a full model. 
Conventional models of business-fixed investment—under 
the key assumptions of convex adjustment costs, complete 
information, and perfect capital markets—imply that a firm’s 
investment demand depends on marginal “ ,” that is, on the 
present discounted expected value of profits from new 
investment. To the extent that business cycles are viewed as 
symmetric variations of economic activity (and hence profits) 
about trend, a recession will be followed by above-trend 
activity, implying that the recession likely would have little 
effect on the present value of a representative firm’s expected 
profit stream and hence on investment demand. In this case, a 
corporate profits tax would not be expected to damp the effect 
of cyclical swings in economic activity on investment demand.
Other models, based on asymmetric information and the 
resulting incentive problems in capital markets, imply that 
information costs and the internal resources of firms influence 
the cost of external funds. Consequently, investment demand 
depends on the “financing constraint” of a firm’s net worth, 
proxied for by current after-tax cash flow, in addition to 
marginal  . Hubbard (1998) provides an excellent discussion 




some controversy. These models imply that the impact of a 
cyclical downturn on before-tax cash flow and hence on 
investment demand would be attenuated by the presence of an 
income tax; thus, the tax would serve as an automatic stabilizer 
for investment demand. 
We now briefly discuss general equilibrium issues. The most 
basic question is whether the economy is better modeled using 
the equilibrium real business-cycle approach, as in Baxter and 
King (1993), or using an approach that allows for nominal 
demand shocks to have real effects in the short run, as in New-
Keynesian models. Although the appropriate framework has 
been the source of ongoing tension among macroeconomists, 
in qualitative terms the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers 
appears invariant to the choice of framework. For the 
remainder of this section, we assume that both frameworks 
embed the basic consumer optimization model analyzed 
above.
In the equilibrium business-cycle approach, a shock that 
reduces aggregate equilibrium output—such as a temporary 
negative labor income endowment shock—generally originates 
on the supply or production side of the economy, and the 
components of aggregate demand must adjust to maintain 
goods market equilibrium. Thus, if personal consumption falls 
(as the above analysis suggests) and if government purchases of 
goods and services are reduced to offset the budget impact of 
lower income tax receipts, then investment likely will decline to 
maintain goods market equilibrium.8 The decline in real 
income net of tax, as well as the decline in government 
purchases, has no immediate effect on output unless labor 
supply adjusts in response to wealth and interest rate effects. 
However, over time, as the capital stock falls relative to 
baseline, output also declines, which in turn reduces 
consumption possibilities. The magnitude of the consumption 
decline will vary inversely with the strength of the automatic 
stabilizers.
By contrast, in a model with sticky wages and prices, 
negative shocks to any component of nominal aggregate 
demand (for example, export demand) can lead to short-run 
reductions in output as labor demand and hours worked 
decline. The resulting fall in after-tax income reduces private 
consumption demand (and government purchases fall if they 
are adjusted to maintain budget balance); the decline in 
consumption is mitigated by the automatic stabilizers for the 
same reasons as discussed earlier. Of course, investment 
demand likely will be boosted by lower interest rates, which 
implies subsequent increases in the capital stock and output; 
again, the magnitude of such increases will vary inversely with 
the strength of the automatic stabilizers. Simulation results 
from a general equilibrium econometric model with New–
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III. Results from the FRB/US Model
In Sections III, IV, and V, we present our empirical results. This 
section presents estimates of the impact of automatic 
stabilizers—particularly income taxes—based on simulations 
of the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US quarterly econometric 
model of the U.S. economy. Detailed discussions of the new 
model can be found in Brayton and Tinsley (1996) and in 
Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999). Households and 
firms are optimizers whose current decisions are based on 
expectations of future conditions. For estimation purposes, 
sectoral expectations are derived from forecasts of small vector 
autoregressions (VARs). Each VAR has a common set of 
variables, including consumer price inflation, the output gap, 
and the federal funds rate. Inclusion of the funds rate means 
that this form of expectations incorporates an average sample 
view of how monetary policy was conducted historically. 
Simulation exercises in this paper also use the same VAR 
systems.
In terms of dynamic adjustments in the model, financial 
market variables such as interest rates and stock prices adjust 
immediately to changes in expectations because financial 
decisions are assumed unaffected by frictions, given the small 
cost of transacting in these markets. However, the response of 
nonfinancial variables such as consumption, investment, and 
employment to changes in fundamentals is not immediate 
because of (nonexplicitly modeled) frictions in the dynamic 
adjustment process such as contracts and capital adjustment 
costs. Indeed, prices and quantities do not adjust quickly 
enough to ensure full resource utilization at all times. In the 
long run, however, all adjustments are complete and all 
markets are clear.
Of particular relevance for the simulation results reported 
below—as well as for a comparison with the prior theoretical 
discussion of Section II and subsequent empirical analysis of 
tax elasticities in Section V—is the modeling of aggregate 
income taxes and consumption in FRB/US. Starting with taxes 
in FRB/US, the average federal personal income tax rate is 
procyclical, implying an elasticity of personal taxes with respect 
to the taxable income base somewhat greater than the 
corresponding elasticity of 1.4 estimated in Section V.9 Social 
insurance contributions are specified as proportional to its tax 
base, implying a unitary elasticity; in Section V, we estimate 
that the elasticity is about 0.9. The average corporate income 
tax rate is mildly procyclical in FRB/US; this contrasts with the 
mildly countercyclical tax rate found in Section V.
Turning to the modeling of aggregate consumption in
FRB/US, we see that a small fraction of consumption decisions 
is made by liquidity-constrained households; the share of after-
tax income associated with this group of households is 
estimated at about 10 percent. This group’s behavior would be 
consistent with the model in Section II D.
However, for most households, consumption depends on 
current property wealth plus the present value of expected 
after-tax labor (and transfer) income in FRB/US. Expected 
future income flows are discounted at a high—25 percent—
annual rate in computing present values, because it is argued 
that households are quite averse to the uncertainty of future 
uninsurable income. As a result of the heavy discounting, 
current consumption is not affected much by changes in 
income taxes in the distant future that might be necessary to 
satisfy the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Put 
another way, the rate used by individuals to discount future 
taxes exceeds the government’s borrowing rate.
Moreover, the simulations below are based on VAR 
expectations that do not incorporate expectations of future tax 
rate changes. Thus, a change in income taxes (owing, say, to an 
aggregate demand shock) has a wealth effect on 
consumption.10 While this is similar to the wealth effect in the 
model of Section II C, there is a difference in that current 
government purchases are not adjusted in FRB/US (and so 
there is no substitution of private for government 
consumption).
Finally, FRB/US may be consistent with a precautionary 
saving motive. This is because prudent households act as if they 
apply a high discount rate to future uncertain income, which is 
the case in the model. Furthermore, consumption depends 
positively in FRB/US on the expected output gap, which is 
viewed as capturing countercyclical variation in the perceived 
riskiness of future before-tax income. Even granting these 
interpretations, the model does not capture the insurance effect of 
income tax rates developed in Section II B; that is, an anticipated 
change in the income tax rate has no effect in FRB/US on the 
variance of after-tax income. Summing up, FRB/US captures 
liquidity and wealth effects associated with the income tax 
system, but does not capture the insurance effect.11 However, 
there is a sense in which the impact of changes in taxes (and 
transfers) on consumption demand is assumed: for example, 
there is no formal testing of the hypothesis that the effects of 
changes in before-tax income and in taxes are of equal and 
opposite signs (and separately statistically significant). Rather, 
after-tax income is the variable included in the FRB/US model 
consumption equations. 
Results of the simulation exercises are reported in Tables 1 
and 2. The model has four federal tax rates (for personal 
income taxes, corporate income taxes, indirect business taxes, 
and social insurance contributions). The effects of automatic 
stabilizers are measured by comparing simulations in which 
each federal tax rate is at its actual value with simulations in 
which each tax rate is set to zero and an add factor (essentially 42 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
a lump-sum tax) is introduced that sets tax receipts equal to 
their baseline values (given the baseline values of the tax bases). 
A demand shock and a supply shock are considered. The 
demand shock (to state and local government purchases) is 
scaled to equal 1 percent of the level of real GDP in the baseline. 
The supply shock is a $5-per-barrel increase in the price of oil. 
Each simulation is run under two monetary policy settings. 
One setting holds the real federal funds rate constant and the 
other uses the Taylor rule—which relates the nominal federal 
funds rate to the output gap and to a four-quarter moving 
average of the inflation rate.12
As shown in Table 1 (panel A), with a fixed real federal funds 
rate, the model’s real GDP “multiplier” is increased only 
modestly by the substitution of lump-sum for income (and 
social insurance and indirect business) taxes, from 1.23 to 1.35 
at the end of four quarters (and increased by a similarly modest 
amount at the end of eight quarters) in the case of the demand 
shock. The impact of the demand shock on personal consumption 
expenditures is also increased only modestly at the end of four 
quarters (although by a much larger percentage amount).13 This 
outcome owes largely to the model’s property that consumption is 
not very sensitive to movements in after-tax income that are 
essentially transitory. Moreover, households expect (through the 
VAR system) a countercyclical policy response to the demand 
shock. When monetary policy is characterized by the Taylor rule 
(panel B), the multipliers on output and consumption are smaller 
than in the prior case, but the increase owing to the elimination of 
the income tax is about the same.
As shown in Table 2, the income tax has very little effect on 
the model multipliers in the case of the adverse supply (oil-price) 
shock. Because the shock pushes real output and prices in 
opposite directions, nominal taxable incomes are not affected 
much. As a result, the level of tax receipts is not very sensitive to 
the presence of income taxes. Of course, taxes in real terms are 
lower; similarly, in the lump-sum tax simulation, real taxes are 
lower following the shock (owing to a higher price level and an 
unchanged level of nominal taxes). Indeed, real taxes in the two 
simulations are similar enough following the shock that the tax 
structure (income versus lump-sum) makes little difference to 
multiplier values.14 The fact that the presence of an income tax 
has virtually no effect on supply shock multipliers is interesting, 
because arguably it is optimal to have no automatic stabilization 
in the face of a supply shock.15
Finally—noting that FRB/US is approximately linear, so that 
positive and negative shocks of equal size have roughly the same 
absolute effect on the major endogenous variables—our 
simulation results shed light on the issue of whether the presence 
of automatic fiscal stabilizers reduces the variance of U.S. real 
GDP. To the extent that variation in real GDP is driven primarily 
by supply-side shocks, our results suggest an extremely limited 
stabilizing role of the income tax system. By contrast, if demand-
side shocks are the primary driving force, income taxes provide a 
modest degree of stabilization. Unfortunately, because our results 
are based on a model estimated over the postwar sample period, 
they are of limited value in answering the question of whether the 
automatic stabilizers have contributed to the reduction in the 
Table 1
Simulated Macroeconomic Effects of a Shock
to Autonomous Aggregate Demand
Percentage Change from Baseline















Panel A: Fixed Real Federal Funds Rate
Four 1.23 .10 .30 1.35 .10 .43
Eight 1.05 .56 .01 1.23 .58 .30
Panel B: Taylor Rule
Four .89 .01 .02 .97 .01 .12
Eight .22 .13 -.57 .30 .14 -.46
Notes: The demand shock is to state and local government purchases and 
is scaled to equal 1 percent of the level of real GDP in the baseline. Real 
GDP is gross domestic product in chain-weighted 1992 dollars;
consumer prices is the personal consumption expenditure chain-
weighted price index; real PCE is personal consumption
expenditure in chain-weighted 1992 dollars.
Table 2
Simulated Macroeconomic Effects of a $5-per-Barrel 
Increase in Oil Prices 
Percentage Change from Baseline















Panel A: Fixed Real Federal Funds Rate
Four -.04 .36 -.15 -.05 .36 -.16
Eight -.16 .78 -.51 -.16 .77 -.50
Panel B: Taylor Rule
Four -.22 .32 -.30 -.24 .32 -.32
Eight -.47 .59 -.71 -.50 .59 -.75
Note: Real GDP is gross domestic product in chain-weighted 1992
dollars; consumer prices is the personal consumption expenditure chain-
weighted price index; real PCE is personal consumption expenditure in 
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volatility of the U.S. macroeconomy that evidently has occurred 
over the past century.
IV. Empirical Results from
the Frequency Domain
In this section, we examine the frequency-domain, or spectral, 
properties of certain federal taxes and tax bases as well as the 
properties of unemployment insurance benefits. To the best of 
our knowledge, this approach has not been taken before. We 
initially present the estimated spectral density functions for 
several types of taxes and then show the squared coherencies of 
these taxes with their respective tax bases. We use National 
Income and Product Account (NIPA) quarterly current-dollar 
tax and income data as well as unified budget tax data, both for 
most of the postwar period. The analysis of unemployment 
insurance benefits also utilizes postwar NIPA data as well as the 
civilian unemployment rate.
In evaluating our results, it is useful to recall that the area 
under the spectrum is simply the variance of a series; also, the 
spectrum is symmetric about the zero frequency, so we plot 
only the estimated spectra for frequencies,  , between 0 and 
.16 Because the techniques of spectral analysis apply to 
stationary time series, we examine the growth rates of the various 
taxes (which are stationary series), rather than the dollar levels. 
In addition, to achieve stationarity, we examine unemployment 
insurance outlays as a percentage of nominal GDP. We focus 
attention on whether a sizable portion of the variance of a series 
is explained by variation at the business-cycle and seasonal 
frequencies—that is, we look for sizable peaks in the estimated 
spectra at these frequencies. In our charts (A1-A12 in the 
appendix), business-cycle frequencies occur between 0.2 and 1.0, 
which correspond to periods   of roughly thirty-two 
quarters and six quarters, respectively (the range of values used 
in the recent literature). Seasonal frequencies are at (or near) 
 and  , corresponding to periods of four quarters and two 
quarters, respectively.
We also present squared coherencies between taxes and 
tax bases.17 The coherency measures the square of the linear 
correlation between the two variables at every frequency and 
is analogous to squared correlation coefficients; the 
coherency can vary between zero and one. For example, if 
the squared coherency is near one at frequency  , it means 
that the  -frequency components of the two series are 
highly related, but a value near zero means that the 
corresponding frequency components are not closely 
related. One must be careful in interpreting the squared 
coherencies in the business-cycle frequency range, because 
w
p




the coherency is simply a bivariate measure. While it 
undoubtedly reveals information about the “automatic” 
response of taxes to income (and unemployment insurance 
outlays to the unemployment rate), it also contains 
information about the relationship between business-cycle 
fluctuations in income and legislated changes in tax rates 
(and between fluctuations in the unemployment rate and 
legislated changes in the unemployment insurance 
program).
Beginning with the NIPA tax data, we see that personal 
income, corporate income, and indirect business tax receipts 
(all in growth rate form) display pronounced spectral peaks at 
business-cycle frequencies (see the charts in the appendix). 
Perhaps surprisingly, social insurance contributions show little 
spectral power at business-cycle frequencies although they 
show substantial power at the seasonal frequencies. The latter 
occurs, even though the data are seasonally adjusted, because of 
the NIPA convention of “level adjusting” this series once every 
four quarters to reflect the impact of a change in the taxable 
maximum wage base.
Squared coherencies at the business-cycle frequencies are 
quite high between the personal income tax and its tax base 
(personal income, less other labor income, less government 
transfer payments, plus personal contributions to social 
insurance) and between corporate income taxes and taxable 
corporate profits. Again, one must be careful in interpreting 
these results because the squared coherencies conceptually 
are picking up both automatic and discretionary changes in 
taxes.
To shed a bit more light on this matter, one can compute 
the gain at the business-cycle frequencies; the gain is 
interpretable as the regression coefficient of taxes on 
income. Because both variables are in growth-rate form, the 
gains provide estimates of tax elasticities at every frequency. 
The gain in the case of corporate income taxes varies within 
the narrow range of 1.0 to 1.1 across the business-cycle 
frequencies, only slightly larger than more standard time-
series estimates (as in Section V) of the “automatic” effect of 
changes in profits on taxes. Thus, the squared coherency 
likely is showing that the automatic piece of the relationship 
is strong at the business-cycle frequencies. A somewhat 
different situation is revealed by the gain between the 
personal income tax and its base, which varies from about 
1.0 to 2.9 across the business-cycle frequencies. Certainly, 
one could reasonably expect, as discussed in Section V, an 
elasticity owing to business-cycle-induced changes in 
incomes greater than or equal to 1, but it is likely that the 
high values of the gain might well be picking up a tendency 
for legislated personal tax cuts to occur during recessions as 
well as picking up the automatic decline in receipts.44 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
Finally, on the NIPA tax side, squared coherencies between 
social insurance contributions and wages and salaries and 
between indirect business taxes and nominal GDP are only of 
moderate size (up to about 0.5).
We now discuss results using unified individual income tax 
data (on a quarterly basis). Because these data are not 
seasonally adjusted (NSA), we also need an NSA personal 
income tax base. Since this is not available, we use NSA 
nominal GDP, which is publicly available. The use of NSA data 
gives a pure reading of real-time fluctuations in taxes and 
income faced by households, but at the cost of introducing a lot 
of noise, especially into the analysis of individual nonwithheld 
taxes (declarations, paid four times per year, plus final 
payments, paid once each year). The squared coherency 
between NSA withheld income taxes and nominal GDP (again, 
both in quarterly growth-rate form) is sizable, both at the 
business-cycle frequencies and at the primary seasonal 
frequency ( ). The former is strongly suggestive of the 
working of automatic stabilizers during business-cycle swings 
while the latter reflects seasonal patterns in labor incomes and 
withheld taxes (such as increases in each that often occur at the 
beginning of calendar years). The gain varies between 1 and 3 
at the business-cycle frequencies, again suggestive of 
discretionary tax changes in addition to the automatic 
stabilizer component. Very similar results at the business-cycle 
frequencies arise when the raw data are filtered using four-
quarter growth rates (although the strong seasonal relationship 
is eliminated, as would be expected).
By contrast, the squared coherency between NSA individual 
nonwithheld taxes and nominal GDP is not large at business-cycle 
frequencies; indeed, the relatively small coherencies apply both to 
declarations and final payments. Such results suggest the relative 
ineffectiveness of automatic stabilizers via this tax channel.
Finally, on the spending side of the budget, the squared 
coherency between unemployment insurance outlays as a 
percentage of GDP and the unemployment rate is very high 
at the business-cycle frequencies. Thus, even though there 
may be a short waiting period to collect benefits, the 
unemployment insurance program appears to operate as an 
effective, virtually automatic, income stabilizer for 
unemployed individuals.18
To sum up, the frequency-domain analysis establishes a very 
strong relationship between income taxes and tax bases at the 
business-cycle frequencies. In all cases, this reflects the 
automatic nature of tax variation—particularly of individual 
withheld taxes—when incomes change, and in some cases it 
likely reflects discretionary tax changes as well. Furthermore, 
unemployment insurance also appears effective as an 
automatic stabilizer of income.
wp 2 ¤ =
V. The High-Employment 
Budget Surplus
In this section, using standard time-domain techniques, we 
present updated empirical estimates of the responsiveness of 
federal taxes and certain spending programs to cyclical swings in 
the economy. While such estimates are useful for many 
purposes, they are used here as a basis for computing the 
cyclically adjusted, or high-employment budget surplus (HEB), 
of the federal government. Although the HEB is not without its 
faults, as discussed in Blinder and Solow (1974), it nonetheless 
has been used as a summary measure of the stance of fiscal policy 
by many U.S. government agencies (and many countries) since 
the 1960s. Twenty years ago, an intergovernmental task force 
developed the “gross-up” methodology currently used by staff at 
the U.S. Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve 
Board (see deLeeuw et al. [1980]).
Using taxes to illustrate the method, high-employment tax 
receipts equal a cyclical adjustment, or a gross-up, plus actual 
(or projected actual) tax receipts. The gross-up is the difference 
between an estimate of taxes at a benchmark (that is, high-
employment) level of economic activity—computed by setting 
the GDP gap equal to zero in key econometric equations—and 
at the actual level of economic activity—computed by using the 
actual GDP gap. As a result, the gross-up method has the 
property that actual and high-employment taxes are equal 
when the economy is operating at potential. More 
fundamentally, the method has the property that unexplained 
shocks to taxable income shares and tax receipts are allowed to 
pass through to high-employment estimates. The remainder of 
this section presents detailed estimates.
A. High-Employment Receipts
The calculation of high-employment receipts involves three 
steps. First, income share equations are estimated to determine 
the level of the tax bases if actual GDP was equal to potential 
GDP. Second, the tax elasticities with respect to cyclical 
changes in income must be estimated. Finally, these two 
estimates are combined to obtain cyclical components of tax 
revenues, which are added to actual revenues to obtain high-





where   is the ratio of the tax base to GDP;   is the 
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The suffix   denotes a high-employment estimate;   is the 
sensitivity of the share of the tax base in GDP to changes in the 
GDP gap ( ); and   is the elasticity of the tax with 
respect to cyclical changes in the tax base.
On the income side, GDP is composed of labor compensation 
(wages and salaries, and supplements to wages and salaries such 
as employer-provided health insurance), capital income 
(corporate profits, proprietors’ income, rental income, 
dividends, and net interest), and GDP less national income (the 
statistical discrepancy between income- and product-side 
measures of GDP as well as indirect taxes and net subsidies to 
businesses). We estimate the cyclical properties of each of these 
income sources using the U.S. Congressional Budget Office’s 
estimates of potential GDP, the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate 
of Unemployment (NAIRU), and the potential labor force. 
From these estimates, we construct estimates of the GDP gap, 
, and the employment gap (Table 3).19 
Our regression equations for income shares are in first-
difference forms of equation 13 because the shares are not 
stationary over the sample period.20 The cyclically adjusted share 
is equal to the actual share less the sum of the products of the 
estimated gap terms and the coefficients. The cyclically adjusted 
shares are obviously smoother (Table 4).
NIPA personal taxes are roughly 45 percent of federal 
NIPA-based receipts. They are composed of personal income 
taxes, estate and gift taxes, and nontaxes (essentially fees and 
fines). As income taxes are about 97 percent of personal taxes, 
we use the personal income tax elasticity for all personal taxes. 
This elasticity,  , can be decomposed into two 
elasticities: the change in income taxes with respect to adjusted 
gross income (AGI), and the change in AGI with respect to 
NIPA-adjusted personal income,  .21 Furthermore, the 
elasticity of income taxes with respect to a change in AGI is a 
weighted sum of the elasticity of taxes to number of returns,  , 
and the elasticity of taxes with respect to average income per 
return,  , where the weights equal the relative contributions of 
changes in returns and average income to cyclical changes in 




 is the percentage gap in number of income tax 
returns,
 is the percentage gap in AGI per tax return,
 is elasticity of personal income taxes with respect to the 
change in number of returns,
 is elasticity of personal income taxes with respect to the 
change in AGI per return, and
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1951 327.5 5.3 61.9 -3.7 -2.3
1952 348.6 5.4 62.2 -2.9 -2.4
1953 367.2 5.4 62.7 -3.4 -3.1
1954 383.9 5.4 63.8 0.7 0.5
1955 402.2 5.4 65.0 -3.2 -1.1
1956 429.2 5.4 66.1 -2.0 -2.1
1957 458.6 5.4 67.1 -0.5 -0.9
1958 485.7 5.4 67.7  3.8 1.5
1959 508.6 5.4 68.2 0.3 -0.2
1960 534.9 5.5 68.9 1.6 -1.0
1961 562.0 5.5 70.1 3.1 0.7
1962 591.7 5.5 71.2 1.1 0.9
1963 622.6 5.5 72.4 0.8 0.8
1964 657.5 5.6 73.6 -0.8 0.2
1965 698.6 5.7 74.8 -2.9 -0.8
1966 749.9 5.8 76.0 -5.1 -1.8
1967 807.8 5.8 77.3 -3.2 -2.2
1968 879.4 5.8 78.5 -3.6 -2.7
1969 957.8 5.8 79.8 -2.5 -3.6
1970 1,046.1 5.9 82.0 1.0 -1.9
1971 1,138.2 5.9 84.4 1.1 -0.0
1972 1,225.9 6.0 86.8 -0.9 -0.7
1973 1,339.7 6.1 89.3 -3.2 -1.4
1974 1,510.5 6.2 91.8 0.9 -0.8
1975 1,705.9 6.2 94.2 4.4 2.9
1976 1,862.7 6.2 96.8 2.3 2.2
1977 2,045.9 6.2 99.4 0.9 1.2
1978 2,269.3 6.3 102.0 -1.0 -0.4
1979 2,544.5 6.3 104.8 -0.5 -0.6
1980 2,860.6 6.2 107.0 2.7 1.0
1981 3,208.4 6.2 108.8 2.9 1.6
1982 3,488.4 6.1 110.6 7.1 4.1
1983 3,721.1 6.1 112.3 5.6 4.4
1984 3,958.5 6.0 114.1 1.4 2.1
1985 4,206.8 6.0 115.9 0.6 1.6
1986 4,442.1 6.0 117.8 0.4 1.0
1987 4,709.1 6.0 119.7 0.4 0.1
1988 5,015.9 5.9 121.6 -0.7 -0.5
1989 5,366.1 5.9 123.6 -1.4 -0.9
1990 5,736.0 5.9 125.4 -0.1 -0.6
1991 6,092.7 5.9 126.9 2.9 1.4
1992 6,382.8 5.8 128.3 2.2 1.9
1993 6,679.4 5.8 129.7 1.8 1.6
1994 6,981.9 5.8 131.2 0.5 0.4
1995 7,312.3 5.7 132.6 0.6 0.1
1996 7,644.9 5.7 134.1 -0.2 -0.2
1997 8,005.5 5.7 135.9 -1.3 -1.1
1998 8,328.8 5.6 137.4 -2.2 -1.4
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office.
Note: NAIRU is the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment.46 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
 is set equal to 1 by assuming that changes in the number of 
tax filers occur in proportion to the existing distribution. By 
assuming that   is 1, we see that   should account for the 
elasticity of the tax code, given the distribution of income, and the 
change in the distribution of income over the cycle. Our estimate 
of  , though, is based solely on the tax structure and the existing 
distribution of income; thus, it abstracts from any potential 
cyclical sensitivity of the income distribution. Equation 16 was 
modified to account for two types of filers, as the number of 
returns and the incomes of single filers appear to exhibit different 
cyclical properties than those of nonsingle filers.
 We calculate   for single and nonsingle filers 
(overwhelmingly married filing jointly, but also heads of 
households, married filing separately, and surviving spouses) 
using SOI cross-sectional data for each year.   for a given 
type of filer is the weighted sum of the elasticities of the AGI 
groups shown in the SOIs where the weights equal the tax 
shares of the groups. The elasticity is estimated by dividing the 






group.23 The effective marginal tax rates are lower than the 
statutory rates because the effective rates incorporate the rise in 
deductions that occurs as income rises and include the tax 
preference for capital-gains realizations.24
Table 5 displays the resulting elasticity estimates,  . Over the 
1951-96 period, the AGI per return elasticity for nonsingle returns 
averaged 1.6, and was 1.5 for single returns. This largely reflects 
differences in the 1950s and 1960s owing to lower average tax rates 
faced by nonsingles in the lower income brackets because of the 
relatively more generous personal exemptions in place at the time. 
Focusing on nonsingle filers, we see that their elasticity fell by 0.1 
as a result of the Reagan tax cuts in the early 1980s and fell by 
another 0.1 with the 1986 Tax Reform Act. During the 1990s, the 
overall elasticity of the tax schedule has hardly changed, as the 
elasticity-boosting effects of the expansion of the Earned Income 
Credit (EIC) and increased marginal income tax rates for high-
income filers have been offset by the decrease in the tax rate on 
capital-gains realizations and the shift in income distribution 
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Sum of gap coefficients -0.018 0.013 -0.139 -0.021 0.010 0.015 -0.017 -0.014
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.07 0.50 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.06
Durbin-Watson 1.63 1.78 2.20 2.02 2.05 1.27 1.80 1.37
Notes: The sample period is first-quarter 1955 to fourth-quarter 1997.  Dependent variables are measured as first differences of the variable divided by GDP.  
Gap terms are first differences of (GDPK-GDP)/GDPK; t-statistics are shown in parentheses.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 47
The weights applied to   and   are estimated by 
calculating relative magnitudes of the effects of the GDP gap on 
filing a return and the cyclical change in income per return. The 
change in returns is modeled as a function of changes in 
employment, tax filing rules, and a dummy variable to capture 
the apparent change in the coefficients after 1977. Regression 
results in Table 6 indicate that until 1977 a 1 percent change in 
employment led to a 2 percent change in single returns, while 
after 1977 there is a one-to-one relationship. The reduction 
probably reflects a variety of demographic factors such as the 
falloff in marriage rates and the entry of married women into the 
labor force over the later period. By contrast, changes in 
employment have a negligible impact on nonsingle filers, 
probably owing to lower levels of unemployment and higher 
levels of income-generating assets of married households. 
Similar results hold for our estimates of the cyclical response of 
AGI per return (Table 7): average income is more cyclically 
sensitive for single filers than for nonsingles. A 1 percent increase 
in aggregate per-employee income results in a 1.41 percent 
increase in income on returns of singles (there is no break in the 
1970s), while the estimate of the coefficient in the case of 
nonsingles is 0.81, but it has not been stable over time.
With these regression results, we can construct the weights 
on   and   for single returns (the weight on   for 
nonsingles is zero owing to the lack of response of the number 





Personal Income Tax Elasticities
Ey Ey Ey
Year Single Nonsingle Epersonal Year Single Nonsingle Epersonal Year Single Nonsingle Epersonal
1951 1.55 1.71 1.48 1967 1.50 1.61 1.39 1983 1.55 1.59 1.40
1952 1.55 1.70 1.47 1968 1.49 1.56 1.35 1984 1.53 1.58 1.40
1953 1.54 1.69 1.46 1969 1.53 1.56 1.36 1985 1.57 1.57 1.40
1954 1.52 1.70 1.46 1970 1.54 1.56 1.36 1986 1.52 1.53 1.36
1955 1.53 1.69 1.45 1971 1.58 1.59 1.38 1987 1.51 1.54 1.37
1956 1.46 1.68 1.44 1972 1.61 1.61 1.39 1988 1.46 1.51 1.34
1957 1.48 1.67 1.43 1973 1.59 1.60 1.39 1989 1.45 1.48 1.33
1958 1.56 1.67 1.44 1974 1.57 1.59 1.38 1990 1.46 1.46 1.31
1959 1.47 1.64 1.41 1975 1.63 1.67 1.45 1991 1.46 1.49 1.33
1960 1.46 1.65 1.41 1976 1.64 1.69 1.46 1992 1.46 1.49 1.33
1961 1.45 1.62 1.39 1977 1.71 1.73 1.50 1993 1.46 1.50 1.33
1962 1.45 1.61 1.38 1978 1.68 1.70 1.48 1994 1.47 1.51 1.34
1963 1.38 1.64 1.39 1979 1.64 1.68 1.47 1995 1.46 1.49 1.32
1964 1.52 1.67 1.43 1980 1.62 1.66 1.45 1996 1.44 1.47 1.31
1965 1.52 1.67 1.43 1981 1.58 1.63 1.43
1966 1.51 1.63 1.40 1982 1.53 1.59 1.40
Table 6
Personal Income Tax Elasticity Regressions, 
Number of Returns Elasticity
Dependent Variable






















Adjusted R2 0.77 0.15
Durbin-Watson 1.58 1.54
Notes: The sample period is 1951 to 1996.  All variables are first
differences of the log of the series. Employment is civilian payroll
employment. Filing requirements is the nominal threshold for filing an 
income tax return. T78 is a dummy of ones beginning in 1978 and D87 is 
a dummy to capture the change in filing requirements from the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, which raised the number of returns from minors.48 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
the product of the coefficient on employment in the returns 
equation and the employment gap. The income per return gap, 
, is the product of the coefficient estimate for the average 
income per return and the per-capita income gap. The 
resulting annual weights on   and   vary wildly over time 
and are quite sensitive to the GDP and employment gap 
measures. In response, we opted to make the weights constant 
over time by taking their average value: the weights on   and 
 are both 0.5.25  The regressions, in panel B of Table 7, 
provide us with estimates of the elasticity of aggregate AGI to 
NIPA-adjusted personal income—the final elasticity needed to 
evaluate equation 16, the elasticity of personal income taxes to 
adjusted personal income. Our estimate,  , is shown 
in Table 5, and it has varied between 1.3 and 1.5.
Social insurance taxes currently exceed 35 percent of NIPA-
based federal revenues. The major components of these taxes 
are Social Security taxes (for Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance [OASDI], Medicare [HI], and railroad 
retirement benefits), federal and state unemployment taxes, 
federal civilian and military retirement contributions, and 
supplemental medical insurance (SMI) premiums.26 An 
estimate of the overall elasticity of social insurance taxes is 
calculated by estimating separate elasticities for employed 
Social Security taxes (FICA), self-employed Social Security 
taxes (SECA), and unemployment insurance taxes. It is 






elasticity as FICA taxes and that other taxes and 
contributions have a zero elasticity with respect to cyclical 
changes in the economy.27
The cyclical income elasticity of FICA contributions—
EFICA—and similarly of SECA contributions, is estimated as a 
weighted average of the elasticities of taxes to changes in 




 is the percentage gap in wage earners,
 is the percentage gap in average wage,
 is the elasticity of FICA contributions to a change in 
employment, and
 is the elasticity of FICA contributions to a change in 
average wages.
As with personal income taxes, we assume that   equals 1 
and   should account for the elasticity of the tax code, given 
the distribution of income.28    is less than 1 because wages 
and salaries above a maximum amount of taxable earnings are 
not subject to OASDHI taxes. The share of workers above 
the wage cap has fallen from 25 percent in the 1960s to about 
6 percent now (and the Medicare portion of the OASDHI tax 
covers full wages). Equation 18 states that aggregate FICA taxes 
are the product of the FICA tax rate and the wages subject to tax, 
broken into two parts: earnings by those below the wage cap and 
EFICA En*ngap Ey*ygap* 1 ngap + () + {} =









Elasticities of AGI per Return and AGI to NIPA-Adjusted Personal Income
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
AGI per Return: Singles AGI per Return: Nonsingles AGI: Singles  AGI: Nonsingles
1951-96 1951-77 1977-96 1951-96 1951-77 1977-96 1987-96 1951-96 1951-96 1951-77 1977-96 1987-96

























NIPA-adjusted 1.13.. 1.07.. 1.08.. . 0.79.. 1.18.. 0.82... 1.32.. NIPA-adjusted 1.41. 0.81.. 0.84.. 0.79.. 1.20..
  income per
  employee





























Adjusted R2 0.64.. 0.45.. 0.86.. 0.37.. 0.52... 0.47... 0.50.. Adjusted R2 0.70.. 0.74.. 0.85.. 0.67.. 0.77..
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the taxable portion of earnings of those with earnings above the 
cap. A little algebra yields the elasticity of taxes with respect to
an increase in income, equation 19.
(18) ,
where:
 = the statutory tax rate, 
 = the average wage of those below the wage cap,
 = the fraction of wage earners below the wage cap,
 = the maximum wages subject to taxation, and
 = the number of wage earners.
(19) .
Calculations using data on the distribution of earners and 
earnings above the wage cap from the annual Social Security 
Bulletin yield the tax-schedule elasticities,  , shown in Table 8. 
The elasticity of FICA taxes with respect to wages and salaries rises 
after the early 1970s because the share of workers below the wage 
cap rises as a result of the 1972 and 1977 amendments to the Social 
Security Act. Similar calculations were made for the elasticity of 
SECA taxes; the elasticity of the SECA tax schedule is, on average, 
25 percent lower than the elasticity of the FICA schedule because 






Ey y*x () y*xw * 1x – () + () ¤ =
Ey
a smaller share of the income earned by the self-employed is 
earned by those below the caps.29
The next step is to estimate the relative shares of the cyclical 
changes to aggregate wage and salary income that result from 
greater employment and greater income per worker. The 
percentage gap in wage earners and percentage gap in average 
wages are estimated by the following regressions (with t-
statistics in parentheses):
FICA:
  = .001 + 1.00 + .013* ,
(.23)(10.0) (3.74)
adj. R2 =.72 
   = .000 + 1.031* ,
(.20) (12.5)
adj. R2 =.79 
 
SECA:
  = -.013 + 1.71* + .066 ,
 (-.61) (2.43) (2.50)
adj. R2 =.21 
D covemp () ln D emp () ln law
D avecovwage () ln D avewage () ln
D covemp () ln D emp () ln law
Table 8
FICA and SECA Tax Elasticities
Ey Esocial Ey Esocial
Year FICA SECA FICA SECA Total Year FICA SECA FICA SECA Total
1951 .49 .26 .81 .72 .80 1974 .61 .30 .85 .74 .84
1952 .45 .26 .79 .72 .79 1975 .60 .31 .85 .74 .84
1953 .41 .25 .78 .72 .77 1976 .60 .32 .85 .74 .84
1954 .40 .25 .77 .72 .77 1977 .60 .34 .85 .75 .84
1955 .46 .34 .80 .75 .79 1978 .58 .32 .84 .74 .83
1956 .43 .31 .79 .74 .78 1979 .68 .40 .88 .77 .87
1957 .41 .29 .78 .73 .77 1980 .71 .45 .89 .79 .88
1958 .40 .29 .77 .73 .77 1981 .73 .49 .90 .81 .89
1959 .45 .31 .79 .74 .79 1982 .74 .51 .90 .81 .90
1960 .43 .31 .78 .74 .78 1983 .76 .52 .91 .82 .90
1961 .41 .30 .78 .74 .77 1984 .75 .49 .91 .81 .90
1962 .39 .27 .77 .73 .76 1985 .75 .48 .90 .80 .90
1963 .37 .25 .76 .72 .76 1986 .75 .48 .91 .80 .90
1964 .35 .23 .75 .71 .75 1987 .74 .47 .90 .80 .90
1965 .33 .18 .75 .69 .74 1988 .72 .43 .89 .79 .89
1966 .48 .25 .80 .72 .80 1989 .73 .45 .90 .79 .89
1967 .45 .22 .79 .71 .78 1990 .75 .47 .90 .80 .90
1968 .52 .26 .82 .72 .81 1991 .77 .52 .91 .82 .91
1969 .47 .25 .80 .72 .79 1992 .76 .53 .91 .82 .90
1970 .45 .23 .79 .71 .79 1993 .77 .54 .91 .83 .91
1971 .41 .22 .78 .71 .77 1994 .80 .60 .92 .85 .92
1972 .45 .25 .79 .72 .79 1995 .78 .60 .92 .85 .91
1973 .52 .26 .82 .72 .81 1996 .78 .60 .92 .85 .9150 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers




 = covered employment, from the Social Security 
Administration,
 = civilian employment,
 = a dummy for changes in coverage, 1 for 1955, 1957, 
1966, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1991,
 = the average wage for covered employment, 
from the Social Security Administration,
 = average wage: total wages and salaries divided by 
civilian employment, and 
 = proprietor’s income divided by covered workers.
 As with the personal income tax elasticity estimates, the 
weights on   and   implied by the regressions move 
dramatically over time—especially when the sum of    and 
 is close to zero—and thus they are very sensitive to 
estimates of potential GDP. As before, we decided to use the 
average weight over time, which placed 62 percent of the 
weight on the employment term for FICA. The resulting point 
estimate for the weight on the employment elasticity for SECA 
was 1.1. This value seemed unreasonable and probably 
reflected the poor fit of the SECA equations, so we opted to use 
the weights from the FICA. Plugging this information into 
equation 17 gives the cyclical income elasticities of FICA and 
SECA, summarized in the Esocial columns in Table 8. The 
weighted average of these two elasticities is shown in the total 
columns.
The elasticity of unemployment taxes to cyclical income was 
approached in a distinct manner. The unemployment insurance 
(UI) tax system has two key features. In most states, the wage cap 
is quite low: indeed, in twelve states the cap is $7,000, and the 
weighted average across states was only $9,000 in 1997.30  The 
second key feature of the system is that tax rates for firms are 
experience-rated. Thus, tax rates tend to rise for several years 
after a recession and fall during an expansion. To capture this 
endogenous behavior, we modeled the UI tax rate ( ) as a 
function of lagged unemployment rates and changes in federal 
tax laws concerning the Federal Unemployment Tax (FUTA) 
wage cap and statutory tax rate.31 Lagged changes in 
unemployment rates for four years and the change in the wage 
cap were significant, but changes in the statutory tax rate—
which have been small and infrequent—had no explanatory 
power (with t-statistics in parentheses):
 =  -.026 + .042  + .074
(-2.85)(4.25) (7.77)
+ .004  + .025  + .60 ,
(-.32) (2.65) (5.51)
adj. R2 =.84











DUIrate DURt 1 – DURt 2 –
DURt3 – DURt4 – DWAGECAP
Corporate profits taxes, excluding Federal Reserve earnings, are 
about 10 percent of federal revenues. Corporate profits tax liability 
 is defined as the product of the average tax rate on income 
subject to tax   and income subject to tax before credits  , 
less tax credits  :  . The average tax rate is 
derived from the data, given the BEA’s estimates for the other 
three terms. Income subject to tax equals modified NIPA 
economic profits (corporate profits less Federal Reserve earnings 
and rest-of-world profits),  , less adjustments,  . The 
adjustments are losses and capital gains, which are added to  , 
as well as tax-exempt interest, state and local corporate taxes, and 
deductions for loss carryovers, which are subtracted. These data 
are found in SOI Corporate Income Tax Returns and in the BEA’s 
reconciliation tables between IRS measures of profits and taxes 
and the NIPA economic profits and profits taxes. Tax credits are 
primarily for foreign taxes and the investment tax credit. The 
elasticity of corporate profits taxes to changes in modified 
corporate profits   is determined as follows:
(20)
,
where   ,
and .
The elasticity of income subject to tax with respect to 
modified corporate profits in equation 20 is found by 
estimating the cyclical sensitivity of the major adjustments to 
corporate profits (Table 9). The elasticities are calculated in 
two steps. In the first step, the adjustments and modified 
profits are regressed against the GDP gap and potential GDP.32 
The elasticity with respect to GDP is estimated by evaluating 
the marginal change at mean GDP. Second, the elasticities of 
the adjustments with respect to GDP are divided by the 
elasticity of modified profits with respect to GDP to produce 
the estimates of the elasticity with respect to modified profits. 
When we plug these results back into equation 20, we obtain an 
average elasticity of income subject to tax with respect to 
modified profits of 0.8; the annual figures vary from 0.3 in 1982 
to 0.96 in 1968 (Table 10).33 These estimates are similar to 
those of deLeeuw et al. (1980). The low elasticity reflects the 
importance of corporate losses, which is the only adjustment 
that causes the elasticity to fall below one.
 is the elasticity of the corporate profits tax rate. This 
is only slightly higher than zero because the corporate income 
tax is not very progressive and few corporate profits are 
generated by firms in the lower tax bracket.34 We have assumed 
that the elasticity of credits with respect to modified profits 
varies with the share of credits that are for foreign taxes (which 
appears to have a zero elasticity) and the share of credits owing 
to investment tax credits (with an assumed 1.0 elasticity). 
Combining the elasticities in equation 20 produces an overall 
CPT ()
t () IST ()




Ecpt cp , t ( *IST Et cp , Eist cp , + () =
C*Ecc , p) t*IST C – () ¤ –
Et cp , Et ist , *Eist cp , =
Eist cp , CP SADJi*Eadj cp , – () CP SADJi – () ¤ =
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Table 10




Relative to Modified Profits
: Corporate Tax 
Accruals Relative to Profits Year
: Income
Subject to Tax
Relative to Modified Profits
: Corporate Tax 
Accruals Relative to Profits
1954 .94 1.00 1975 .76 1.11
1955 .94 1.01 1976 .84 1.23
1956 .94 1.01 1977 .88 1.28
1957 .90   .97 1978 .90 1.26
1958 .88   .96 1979 .85 1.29
1959 .92   .99 1980 .68   .90
1960 .85   .92 1981 .54   .64
1961 .89   .98 1982 .31   .22
1962 .90   .98 1983 .52   .60
1963 .90   .99 1984 .58   .67
1964 .92 1.01 1985 .63   .78
1965 .95 1.05 1986 .70   .88
1966 .95 1.06 1987 .66   .81
1967 .94 1.06 1988 .64   .82
1968 .96 1.08 1989 .58   .72
1969 .88   .99 1990 .49   .62
1970 .74   .86 1991 .48   .60
1971 .81   .96 1992 .59   .72
1972 .88 1.05 1993 .70   .85







Elasticities of Adjustments to Modified Corporate Profits
Dependent Variable
Modified Profits State Profits Taxes Tax-Exempt Interest Capital Gains Losses Loss Carryovers
Constant 17.4 -2.23 -1.53 -0.25 -1.87 -0.96
(4.26) (-13.0) (-17.0) (-0.50) (-2.36) (-5.62)
Gap -0.262 -0.003 -0.001 -0.048 0.038 -.005
(-3.34) (-0.94) (-0.72) (-4.97) (2.47) (-1.66)
Potential GDP 0.063 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.015 0.004
(19.0) (44.5) (65.3) (17.2) (22.9) (30.5)
Elasticity with respect
  to GDP at mean
3.75 0.58 0.37 7.05 -2.90 1.64
Elasticity with respect
  to modified profits
N.A. 0.16 0.11 2.13 -0.88 0.50
Adjusted R2 .94 .99 .99 .93 .96 .98
Note: The sample period is 1956 to 1994.52 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
elasticity of corporate profits taxes to NIPA economic profits of 
0.9 on average (Table 10).
Indirect business taxes, which constitute only 5 percent of 
federal receipts, are composed of excise taxes, customs duties, 
and business nontaxes. As before, the elasticity is the weighted 
sum of the elasticities of each tax, where the weights are the 
share of the receipts in total taxes and the elasticity of excise 
taxes and customs duties are the demand elasticities with 
respect to cyclical GDP.
The share estimates are constructed using the BEA’s annual 
estimates of these taxes. The elasticities for excise taxes and 
nontaxes are built up from the elasticities of their components. 
The elasticities of the various components are assumed to be 
constant over time; thus, the variation over time in the excise 
tax and nontax elasticities reflects changes in the composition 
of these taxes. The elasticity of customs duties is set at 2.0, the 
cyclical elasticity found in the FRB/US model. Our estimates of 
the elasticities of indirect business taxes and their components 
with respect to cyclical income are shown in Table 11.
The elasticity of excise taxes with respect to cyclical income 
is obtained by taking the sum of the products of the share of 
each tax receipt in total excise taxes and the demand elasticity 
of the taxed good (the latter drawn from various prior studies). 
Table 11 shows the change in the composition of excise taxes 
over the years and the elasticities used for each tax. The rise and 
decline of importance of auto excise taxes and windfall profits 
taxes are the major contributors to changes in the elasticity of 
excise taxes over time.
The elasticity of business nontaxes has risen over time owing 
to the rising share of deposit insurance premiums in nontaxes. 
We assume that the cyclical income elasticity of deposit 
premiums is equal to one, reflecting the income elasticity of 
deposits. Note that the cyclical elasticity will be different than 
one to the extent that the opportunity costs of deposits are 
cyclical. The other major element of nontaxes is rents and 
royalties from resource extraction on the outer continental 
shelf; we assume that it has a zero elasticity. Finally, other 
nontaxes consist largely of proprietary receipts paid to the 
Department of Agriculture (for example, inspection fees), the 
Department of the Interior (timber, mineral, and water), and 
fines. Some of the fees are a condition of doing business and 
presumably are inelastic with respect to the level of output, 
while others depend upon the level of business activity and thus 
are more elastic. As a guess, we assume that these other nontaxes 
Table 11
Indirect Business Taxes: Shares of Receipts for Selected Years
1955 1965 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Elasticity
Share in indirect business taxes
Excise 91 80 71 68 59 54 63 —
Customs 7 12 19 18 21 27 21 2.0
Nontaxes 3 8 9 14 20 19 16 —
Share in excise
Alcohol 30 26 32 21 16 16 13 0.75
Gas 10 18 24 15 26 29 36 0.5
Tobacco 17 15 14 9 13 12 10 0.0
Diesel 0 1 2 2 8 9 11 0.5
Airline 2 1 5 6 7 10 10 1.5
T e l e p h o n e 6 71 2 3787 1 . 0
Windfall oil profits 0 0 0 35 15 0 0 0.0
Motor vehicle 13 18 4 3 3 4 3 2.7
Other manufacturing 7 10 8 0 0 0 0 2.0
Other 14 3 0 6 6 11 9 1.0
Share in nontaxes
Off-shore oil 0 9 30 42 30 19 18 0.0
Deposit insurance premiums 33 18 20 12 27 39 29 1.0
Other 67 73 50 46 43 42 52 0.5
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had an elasticity of 0.5. Table 12 reports our estimates of the 
elasticity of indirect business taxes with respect to cyclical GDP.
After calculating the high-employment income shares and 
elasticities, we calculated HEB taxes using the gross-up method 
by adjusting actual taxes by the tax elasticity times the 
percentage difference between the actual and the high-
employment tax base. To compute HEB taxes through 1998, we 
extend forward the various tax elasticities using the most recent 
historical estimate. The results are summarized in Tables 13 
and 14. The far right column of Table 13 shows the cyclical 
change in tax revenues as a percentage of potential GDP per 
1 percentage point of GDP growth. Thus, in 1998, a pick-up 
of GDP growth of 1 percentage point would boost revenues by 
0.31 percent of GDP. This corresponds to an elasticity of 
receipts to cyclical changes in GDP of 1.5, a figure in excess of 
the individual tax elasticities because of the relatively elastic 
changes of the tax bases. Over time, this 0.3 response of taxes 
with respect to cyclical changes in GDP has been relatively 
constant, ignoring the values obtained when the GDP gap is 
small, despite the large changes in marginal tax rates, because 
the individual tax elasticities have not changed as much as 
implied by the changes in statutory rates and because the 
downward drift in the personal income tax elasticity has been 
offset by the rise in the elasticity of social insurance taxes.
Table 14 highlights the sources of cyclical variation in 
receipts. Historically, 40 to 50 percent of the change has come 
from personal taxes while another 33 to 50 percent has come 
from corporate taxes. Social insurance contributions have 
grown in importance over time and now account for roughly 
20 percent of the cyclical variation in taxes. Corporate income 
taxes generate more of the cyclical response than social 
insurance contributions, despite their smaller share of overall 
receipts and similar tax elasticity, because their tax base—
profits—is much more cyclical than wages.
Table 12


















1951 1.03 2.0 .75 1.09 1974 0.82 2.0 .49 0.99
1952 0.97 2.0 .75 1.03 1975 0.82 2.0 .45 1.08
1953 1.02 2.0 .75 1.07 1976 0.78 2.0 .44 0.99
1954 1.03 2.0 .75 1.06 1977 0.75 2.0 .42 0.98
1955 1.02 2.0 .67 1.08 1978 0.76 2.0 .42 1.03
1956 1.09 2.0 .67 1.13 1979 0.79 2.0 .39 1.03
1957 1.04 2.0 .67 1.09 1980 0.50 2.0 .35 0.75
1958 1.04 2.0 .67 1.09 1981 0.32 2.0 .34 0.58
1959 1.00 2.0 .66 1.07 1982 0.40 2.0 .36 0.67
1960 1.04 2.0 .67 1.11 1983 0.49 2.0 .40 0.74
1961 0.99 2.0 .54 1.05 1984 0.53 2.0 .41 0.81
1962 1.01 2.0 .55 1.07 1985 0.60 2.0 .49 0.87
1963 1.05 2.0 .55 1.10 1986 0.70 2.0 .55 1.01
1964 1.07 2.0 .55 1.12 1987 0.72 2.0 .57 1.04
1965 1.12 2.0 .55 1.16 1988 0.72 2.0 .58 1.04
1966 1.03 2.0 .55 1.11 1989 0.75 2.0 .56 1.07
1967 0.99 2.0 .52 1.07 1990 0.76 2.0 .60 1.06
1968 0.98 2.0 .53 1.08 1991 0.72 2.0 .65 0.98
1969 1.05 2.0 .52 1.13 1992 0.71 2.0 .64 0.99
1970 1.04 2.0 .51 1.13 1993 0.73 2.0 .67 1.01
1971 1.03 2.0 .46 1.14 1994 0.73 2.0 .65 0.98
1972 0.86 2.0 .44 1.00 1995 0.73 2.0 .55 0.98











(Percentage of GDPK) GDP Gap
Response of Taxes
to a 1 Percent GDP Change
(Percentage of GDP)
1951 60.2 64.7 -4.5 -1.4 -3.7 0.37
1952 64.5 67.8 -3.3 -1.0 -2.9 0.33
1953 66.5 70.5 -4.0 -1.1 -3.4 0.32
1954 65.7 64.3 1.4 0.4 0.7 0.54
1955 69.3 73.2 -3.8 -1.0 -3.2 0.30
1956 75.9 78.6 -2.7 -0.6 -2.0 0.31
1957 82.2 82.6 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 0.15
1958 85.7 79.5 6.2 1.3 3.8 0.34
1959 91.2 90.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.45
1960 99.3 97.0 2.3 0.4 1.5 0.29
1961 105.0 99.0 6.0 1.1 3.1 0.35
1962 109.1 107.2 1.9 0.3 1.1 0.29
1963 117.0 115.5 1.5 0.2 0.8 0.29
1964 114.5 116.2 -1.7 -0.3 -0.8 0.30
1965 119.5 125.8 -6.4 -0.9 -2.9 0.31
1966 131.5 143.5 -12.0 -1.6 -5.1 0.32
1967 144.8 152.6 -7.8 -1.0 -3.2 0.30
1968 167.2 176.9 -9.6 -1.1 -3.6 0.31
1969 192.0 199.5 -7.5 -0.8 -2.6 0.30
1970 199.5 195.1 4.4 0.4 1.0 0.43
1971 208.9 203.3 5.6 0.5 1.1 0.44
1972 230.5 232.6 -2.0 -0.2 -0.9 0.18
1973 250.9 264.0 -13.1 -1.0 -3.2 0.30
1974 299.5 295.2 4.4 0.3 0.8 0.34
1975 321.9 297.4 24.5 1.4 4.4 0.32
1976 357.6 343.1 14.5 0.8 2.3 0.33
1977 395.0 389.6 5.4 0.3 0.9 0.28
1978 438.8 446.5 -7.7 -0.3 -0.9 0.36
1979 504.1 511.1 -6.9 -0.3 -0.5 0.52
1980 581.9 561.5 20.3 0.7 2.6 0.27
1981 674.3 649.3 25.0 0.8 2.9 0.27
1982 696.9 646.4 50.5 1.4 7.0 0.21
1983 725.5 671.9 53.6 1.4 5.6 0.26
1984 757.5 746.9 10.6 0.3 1.4 0.19
1985 812.4 811.3 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.04
1986 850.5 850.1 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.02
1987 937.5 937.5 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.00
1988 983.9 997.2 -13.3 -0.3 -0.7 0.40
1989 1,056.9 1,079.4 -22.4 -0.4 -1.4 0.31
1990 1,124.8 1,129.8 -5.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.56
1991 1,192.8 1,149.0 43.8 0.7 2.9 0.25
1992 1,240.7 1,198.5 42.2 0.7 2.2 0.30
1993 1,307.1 1,275.1 32.1 0.5 1.8 0.26
1994 1,380.4 1,374.7 5.7 0.1 0.5 0.16
1995 1,466.1 1,460.4 5.8 0.1 0.6 0.14
1996 1,577.8 1,584.7 -6.9 -0.1 -0.2 0.42
1997 1,687.1 1,720.0 -32.8 -0.4 -1.3 0.31
1998 1,788.1 1,844.2 -56.1 -0.7 -2.2 0.31FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 55
B. High-Employment Expenditures
Among expenditures, only those transfers and grants that are 
oriented toward income support respond automatically 
to changes in economic activity. Among these, unemployment 
benefits rise rapidly during a downturn in activity. The number 
of beneficiaries of low-income and disability programs—such 
as Food Stamps, the Earned Income Credit, welfare (Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC, and Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, or TANF), and disability 
insurance—expand as well, but only to a small extent. The large 
retirement transfers are essentially unaffected by fluctuations 
in the economy.35
Unemployment benefits are available for involuntarily 
unemployed workers who were recently employed and meet 
certain criteria. In general, benefits can last for up to twenty-six 
weeks, or up to thirty-nine weeks under the extended benefits 
program for workers in areas with high unemployment. This 
permanent extended benefits program was instituted in 1970. 
The HEB excludes expenditures by the permanent program. 
However, both before and after that time, temporary extended 
benefits programs were enacted near the end of each recession. 
HEB estimates typically include these expenditures because 
they are not automatic; they result from discretionary policies. 
However, for some uses of the HEB it may be appropriate to 
exclude these payments as well. Table 15 provides a summary 
of the temporary programs.
Unemployment benefits have become less sensitive to 
business-cycle fluctuations over the past two decades as the 
criteria for obtaining benefits have been tightened and the 
taxation of benefits effectively reduced their value. In 1975, 
76 percent of the unemployed qualified for benefits, but this 
share had fallen to only 52 percent by 1992. Excluding the 
temporary extended benefits programs (but not benefits 
Table 14























1951 -4.5 -1.4 -2.6 -0.1 -0.4 1975 24.5 8.0 11.4 3.9 1.2
1952 -3.3 -1.4 -1.8 0.2 -0.3 1976 14.5 6.4 5.9 1.6 0.6
1953 -4.0 -1.7 -2.3 0.4 -0.4 1977 5.4 3.7 2.3 -0.8 0.2
1954 1.4 0.0 0.8 0.5 0.1 1978 -7.7 -1.4 -4.5 -1.6 -0.3
1955 -3.8 -1.1 -2.7 0.3 -0.4 1979 -6.9 -3.0 -1.6 -2.2 -0.2
1956 -2.7 -1.3 -1.3 0.1 -0.3 1980 20.3 7.8 9.6 2.0 0.9
1957 -0.4 -0.6 -0.2 0.5 -0.1 1981 25.0 13.3 6.9 3.8 1.0
1958 6.2 1.9 3.2 0.6 0.5 1982 50.5 30.4 8.6 9.0 2.5
1959 0.6 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.0 1983 53.6 29.7 13.5 8.0 2.3
1960 2.3 0.7 1.4 -0.1 0.2 1984 10.6 10.2 3.0 -3.3 0.7
1961 6.0 2.2 2.9 0.5 0.5 1985 1.2 4.1 2.1 -5.4 0.3
1962 1.9 1.0 0.8 -0.1 0.2 1986 0.5 2.1 2.6 -4.5 0.2
1963 1.5 0.8 0.8 -0.2 0.1 1987 0.1 2.9 1.7 -4.8 0.2
1964 -1.7 -0.4 -1.1 -0.1 -0.2 1988 -13.3 -2.8 -4.5 -5.6 -0.4
1965 -6.4 -1.8 -3.6 -0.4 -0.5 1989 -22.4 -8.3 -8.0 -5.2 -0.9
1966 -12.0 -4.2 -6.3 -0.7 -0.8 1990 -5.0 -3.8 0.3 -1.5 -0.1
1967 -7.8 -3.5 -3.6 -0.1 -0.5 1991 43.8 16.5 15.1 9.8 2.3
1968 -9.6 -3.7 -5.4 0.2 -0.7 1992 42.2 19.8 11.7 8.9 1.8
1969 -7.5 -3.8 -3.6 0.5 -0.5 1993 32.1 13.8 12.8 3.8 1.6
1970 4.4 0.3 2.1 1.9 0.2 1994 5.7 4.4 2.3 -1.5 0.5
1971 5.6 1.5 1.7 2.1 0.3 1995 5.8 2.3 4.5 -1.6 0.5
1972 -2.0 -0.4 -2.3 0.8 -0.2 1996 -6.9 -1.4 -2.7 -2.5 -0.2
1973 -13.1 -4.8 -6.8 -0.8 -0.7 1997 -32.8 -12.2 -12.8 -6.6 -1.1
1974 4.4 -0.2 3.3 1.0 0.2 1998 -56.1 -24.1 -20.6 -9.4 -1.956 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
paid under the 1970 Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act), a 1-percentage-point increase in the 
unemployment rate would boost unemployment benefits by 
about $5 billion in 1998 and would boost the permanent 
extended benefits program by varying amounts depending 
on the level of unemployment.36
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program 
was never very cyclically sensitive. Its successor program, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, is essentially a 
block grant to states and thus it is no longer sensitive to the 
business cycle from the federal government’s perspective. 
Our estimates of the cyclical response of AFDC are based on 
Blank (1997). She finds that a 1-percentage-point increase 
in the unemployment rate raises traditional AFDC caseloads 
(single-parent households) by 3½ percent over an eighteen-
month period, which then declines to about a 2 percent 
increase after three years. About 10 percent of AFDC expenses 
are for AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP), a program for 
couples that appears to be much more cyclically responsive. 
AFDC-UP caseloads rise by about 20 percent during the first 
one and a half years, before easing to a 15 percent rise after 
three years.37 The following equation approximates the 
dynamic response of total caseloads to an increase in 
unemployment as estimated by Blank:
(.006  + .006
+ .006 + .006
+ .006 + .006
- .003 - .003
- .003 - .003
- .003 - .003 ).
A rise in the unemployment rate of 1 percentage point would 
boost AFDC payments by 5 percent after one and a half years 
and by only 2½ percent after three years. In its peak year—
1994—the federal government spent $13 billion for program 
DAFDC AFDC* = DURt1 – DURt2 –
DURt3 – DURt4 –
DURt5 – DURt6 –
DURt7 – DURt8 –
DURt9 – DURt1 0 –
DURt1 1 – DURt1 2 –
Table 15
Temporary Unemployment Insurance Extended Benefits
Year Provisions Expenditures 
1958-59 Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act provided a voluntary program 
under which states could extend benefits for up to thirteen weeks. Financed by 
interest-free loans to the states.
2 million workers received $0.6 billion from June 1958 
to April 1959.
1961-62 Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act extended benefits for 
thirteen weeks.  Financed by a temporary tax.
2.8 million workers received $0.82 billion from
March 1961 to June 1962
1970 Extended Unemployment Compensation Act initiated permanent extended
benefits program.
Outlays under this program have been made every year.
1971-72 Emergency Unemployment Act provided thirteen weeks beyond the extended 
benefits period, for a total of fifty-two weeks.
$0.6 billion in 1971 and 1972
1974-78 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1974 (plus three subsequent 
extensions) extended benefits for up to sixty-five weeks.
$6.5 billion in 1975-78
1974 Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act provided a temporary pro-
gram for the uninsured: farm workers, domestic workers, and S&L employees.
$2.5 billion
1982-85 Federal Supplemental Compensation Program (and six subsequent extensions)  $9.3 billion:
provided for up to fourteen weeks of assistance to workers who had exhausted  $1.2 billion in 1982
their benefits. $5.4 billion in 1983
$2.3 billion in 1984
$0.7 billion in 1985
1991-94 Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act (and four extensions). $27.8 billion:
$0.8 billion in 1991
$13.6 billion in 1992
$11.9 billion in 1993
$1.4 billion in 1994FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 57
benefits (and another $1.5 billion for administrative expenses): 
thus, a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate 
would have raised federal outlays by only $0.5 billion, or
$1 billion for the combined federal and state governments. The 
equation is set to zero beginning in 1997.38
The Food Stamp program has similar responsiveness to 
unemployment rates as found in AFDC. Thus, we used the 
same estimates. By contrast, this program may have become 
more cyclically sensitive for the federal government because 
the eligibility rules enacted in 1996 limit the amount of time 
nonworking individuals are eligible for benefits. Here, a
5 percent increase in expenditures after one and a half years 
implies that expenditures would rise by $1 billion.
Medicaid expenditures will also be raised by an increase in 
unemployment, as more individuals qualify for AFDC/TANF 
and become eligible for benefits. Only one-third of Medicaid 
payments go to the nonaged poor; thus, a 5 percent increase in 
AFDC enrollments would boost overall Medicaid expenditures 
by 1½ percent, or about $1.5 billion in 1998.
The Earned Income Credit was greatly expanded in the 
1990s, from a minor program to the federal government’s 
largest low-income support program. The portion of the 
credit that exceeds the income tax due is recorded in the 
budget as an outlay.39 There is no cyclical experience with 
this greatly expanded credit. To fill the gap, we estimated the 
elasticity using the personal income tax methodology, 
assuming that all changes occur owing to income per family 
rather than to number of families.40
For a family with one child, the EIC in 1996 rose by









































1951 55.0 54.4 0.6 0.2 -2.0 1975 367.2 371.3 -4.1 -0.2 2.3
1952 64.2 63.3 1.0 0.3 -2.3 1976 397.0 400.3 -3.3 -0.2 1.5
1953 69.2 68.1 1.1 0.3 -2.4 1977 434.2 435.9 -1.7 -0.1 0.8
1954 65.4 65.5 -0.1 -0.0 0.2 1978 478.6 478.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2
1955 67.2 66.9 0.3 0.1 -1.0 1979 530.7 529.5 1.2 0.0 -0.4
1956 70.6 70.0 0.5 0.1 -1.3 1980 620.4 622.5 -2.0 -0.1 1.0
1957 78.9 78.4 0.6 0.1 -1.1 1981 703.1 707.1 -4.0 -0.1 1.4
1958 84.0 84.9 -0.9 -0.2 1.4 1982 770.8 781.1 -10.3 -0.3 3.6
1959 87.9 88.0 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 1983 836.0 846.4 -10.3 -0.3 3.5
1960 89.6 89.6 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 1984 898.3 902.9 -4.6 -0.1 1.5
1961 95.4 96.1 -0.7 -0.1 1.2 1985 971.7 974.2 -2.5 -0.1 1.2
1962 104.3 104.4 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 1986 1,024.9 1,027.6 -2.7 -0.1 1.0
1963 110.1 110.2 -0.0 -0.0 0.1 1987 1,065.5 1,066.3 -0.8 -0.0 0.2
1964 115.6 115.4 0.3 0.0 -0.4 1988 1,120.1 1,118.5 1.7 0.0 -0.4
1965 123.1 122.5 0.7 0.1 -1.2 1989 1,195.7 1,192.7 3.0 0.1 -0.6
1966 142.1 140.9 1.2 0.2 -2.0 1990 1,286.3 1,284.5 1.7 0.0 -0.3
1967 162.3 160.9 1.4 0.2 -1.9 1991 1,340.3 1,345.0 -4.8 -0.1 1.0
1968 181.3 179.7 1.6 0.2 -2.2 1992 1,479.8 1,479.4 -9.6 -0.1 1.7
1969 192.7 190.8 1.9 0.2 -2.4 1993 1,518.4 1,525.8 -7.3 -0.1 1.1
1970 210.1 209.1 1.0 0.1 -0.9 1994 1,559.0 1,561.4 -2.4 -0.0 0.3
1971 228.5 228.6 -0.1 -0.0 0.0 1995 1,636.3 1,634.7 1.6 0.0 -0.1
1972 253.3 253.1 0.2 0.0 -0.4 1996 1,697.6 1,695.0 2.6 0.0 -0.3
1973 276.5 275.1 1.4 0.1 -1.3 1997 1,745.1 1,741.0 4.1 0.1 -0.7
1974 313.1 312.1 1.1 0.1 -0.5 1998 1,778.8 1,771.4 7.4 0.1 -1.158 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
income reached $6,330. It was constant for earned income 
up to $11,610 and then was phased out at the rate of sixteen 
cents per dollar until $25,078. Thus, the sign of the elasticity 
to an increase in earned income depends upon the relative 
magnitudes of the amount of earnings in the three regions. 
Most EIC payments go to those in the phase-out range, and 
a 1 percent increase in incomes would, on net, reduce the 
EIC by 0.9 percent.41 Using our earlier result—that a
1 percent increase in NIPA-adjusted personal income raises 
AGI for nonsingles by 0.8 percent—we obtain the following 
equation for the cyclical component of the EIC:
,
where   is the gap of adjusted personal income (in 
percentage points) and is lagged one year because EIC 
DEIC EIC t () * 100 ( YADJGAP t 1 – () + =
*0.8* 0.9) – () 100 ¤
YADJGAP
outlays are paid out largely when tax returns are filed. With 
refundable credits totaling $24 billion, a 1-percentage-point 
increase in NIPA-adjusted personal income would reduce 
outlays by $0.2 billion.
The federal government provides cash benefits for 
persons with severe disabilities through two programs: the 
Disability Insurance (DI) program of OASDI and the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. Eligibility for 
the DI program is based on work experience while the SSI 
program does not require work experience and is means-
tested. Econometric evidence indicates that one of the 
factors that affects applications and awards for these 
programs is the unemployment rate. While the 
unemployment rate appears to have a stronger impact on DI 
applications than it does on SSI applications, the impacts on 
Table 17



















1951 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 1975 -4.1 -3.5 -0.6 5.3
1952 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 1976 -3.3 -2.0 -1.3 6.0
1953 1.1 1.0 0.1 0.0 1977 -1.7 -1.1 -0.6 3.6
1954 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 1978 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.9
1955 0.3 0.4 -0.0 0.0 1979 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.2
1956 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 1980 -2.0 -2.0 0.0 1.6
1957 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 1981 -4.0 -2.8 -1.3 1.3
1958 -0.9 -0.9 -0.0 0.0 1982 -10.3 -8.1 -2.2 3.5
1959 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 1983 -10.3 -7.1 -3.2 7.2
1960 -0.0 -0.0 0.0 0.0 1984 -4.6 -2.7 -1.9 2.3
1961 -0.7 -0.7 -0.0 0.6 1985 -2.5 -2.4 -0.1 0.8
1962 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.2 1986 -2.8 -2.3 -0.4 0.1
1963 -0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.0 1987 -0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.1
1964 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.0 1988 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.0
1965 0.7 0.6 0.1 -0.0 1989 3.0 1.8 1.2 0.0
1966 1.2 1.0 0.2 -0.0 1990 1.7 0.9 0.9 0.0
1967 1.4 1.1 0.2 -0.0 1991 -4.8 -3.7 -1.0 1.0
1968 1.6 1.4 0.2 -0.0 1992 -9.6 -5.9 -3.7 13.5
1969 1.9 1.6 0.3 -0.0 1993 -7.3 -3.7 -3.6 12.0
1970 1.0 0.7 0.3 -0.0 1994 -2.4 -1.2 -1.2 1.8
1971 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1 0.7 1995 1.6 0.5 1.1 0.0
1972 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.5 1996 2.6 1.2 1.3 0.0
1973 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.0 1997 4.1 3.0 1.1 0.0
1974 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.0 1998 7.4 5.1 2.2 0.0
Note: The temporary portion of extended benefits is not included in cyclical expenditures.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 59
awards are equivalent. In each case, a rise in the 
unemployment rate of 1 percentage point raises awards by 
2 percent.42 In the case of the DI program, new awards 
represent about 10 percent of the total caseload. For SSI, only 
half of the caseload is disabled working-age adults (the rest 
are disabled children and the elderly), and new awards are 
about 10 percent of this subset of the overall caseload. In 
1998, expenditures on these two programs were $50 billion 
for DI and $30 billion for SSI. Thus, a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the unemployment rate would boost outlays by 
$0.1 billion in the DI program and by $0.03 billion in the SSI 
program.43
C. The High-Employment Surplus
As shown in Table 16, in 1998 the actual unemployment rate 
was 1.1 percentage points below the CBO estimate of the 
NAIRU, which depressed expenditures by $7 billion, about
0.4 percent of total expenditures (a 4 percent increase in the 
affected programs).44 Most of the increase occurred as 
increased unemployment benefits (Table 17). To put this in 
context with receipts, a 1 percent fall in GDP is comparable to 
about a ½ percent increase in unemployment; thus, a 1 percent 
fall in GDP would boost expenditures by $3 billion, compared 
with a $30 billion reduction in receipts in the first year.
Table 18 shows the effects of the business cycle on the 
budget surplus. Over the past decade, the cyclical component 
of the surplus has swung by 1.5 percentage points of GDP, 
from adding 0.8 percentage point to the deficit in 1992 to 
boosting the surplus by 0.7 percentage point in 1998.
Table 18
Current Surplus (+)/Deficit (-)
HEB Actual Cyclical HEB Actual Cyclical HEB Actual Cyclical HEB Actual Cyclical
Year (Billions of Dollars) (Percentage of GDP) Year (Billions of Dollars) (Percentage of GDP)
1951 5.2 10.3 -5.1 1.6 3.1 -1.6 1975 -45.3 -73.9 28.6 -2.7 -4.3 1.7
1952 0.2 4.5 -4.3 0.1 1.3 -1.2 1976 -39.4 -57.2 17.8 -2.1 -3.1 1.0
1953 -2.7 2.4 -5.1 -0.7 0.7 -1.4 1977 -39.2 -46.3 7.1 -1.9 -2.3 0.3
1954 0.3 -1.2 1.5 0.1 -0.3 0.4 1978 -39.8 -31.7 -8.1 -1.8 -1.4 -0.4
1955 2.1 6.3 -4.2 0.5 1.6 -1.0 1979 -26.6 -18.5 -8.1 -1.0 -0.7 -0.3
1956 5.3 8.6 -3.3 1.2 2.0 -0.8 1980 -38.5 -60.9 22.4 -1.3 -2.1 0.8
1957 3.3 4.2 -1.0 0.7 0.9 -0.2 1981 -28.8 -57.8 29.0 -0.9 -1.8 0.9
1958 1.7 -5.5 7.1 0.3 -1.1 1.5 1982 -73.9 -134.7 60.8 -2.1 -3.9 1.7
1959 3.3 2.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.1 1983 -110.5 -174.4 63.9 -3.0 -4.7 1.7
1960 9.7 7.3 2.4 1.8 1.4 0.4 1984 -140.8 -156.0 15.2 -3.6 -3.9 0.4
1961 9.5 2.8 6.7 1.7 0.5 1.2 1985 -159.3 -163.0 3.7 -3.8 -3.9 0.1
1962 4.8 2.8 2.0 0.8 0.5 0.3 1986 -174.3 -177.5 3.2 -3.9 -4.0 0.1
1963 6.9 5.3 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.2 1987 -128.0 -128.9 0.9 -2.7 -2.7 0.0
1964 -1.1 0.9 -2.0 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 1988 -136.3 -121.3 -15.0 -2.7 -2.4 -0.3
1965 -3.7 3.4 -7.1 -0.5 0.5 -1.0 1989 -138.7 -113.3 -25.4 -2.6 -2.1 -0.5
1966 -10.6 2.6 -13.2 -1.4 0.4 -1.8 1990 -161.5 -154.7 -6.8 -2.8 -2.7 -0.1
1967 -17.5 -8.3 -9.2 -2.2 -1.0 -1.1 1991 -147.5 -196.1 48.5 -2.4 -3.2 0.8
1968 -14.1 -2.8 -11.3 -1.6 -0.3 -1.3 1992 -229.1 -280.9 51.8 -3.6 -4.4 0.8
1969 -0.7 8.7 -9.4 -0.1 0.9 -1.0 1993 -211.3 -250.7 39.4 -3.2 -3.8 0.6
1970 -10.7 -14.1 3.4 -1.0 -1.3 0.3 1994 -178.6 -186.7 8.0 -2.6 -2.7 0.1
1971 -19.6 -25.4 5.7 -1.7 -2.2 0.5 1995 -170.2 -174.3 4.2 -2.3 -2.4 0.1
1972 -22.8 -20.5 -2.3 -1.9 -1.7 -0.2 1996 -119.8 -110.3 -9.5 -1.6 -1.4 -0.1
1973 -25.6 -11.1 -14.5 -1.9 -0.8 -1.1 1997 -58.0 -21.1 -36.9 -0.7 -0.3 -0.5
1974 -13.6 -16.9 3.3 -0.9 -1.1 0.2 1998 9.3 72.8 -63.5 0.1 0.9 -0.860 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
VI. Conclusion
This paper presents theoretical and empirical analysis of 
automatic fiscal stabilizers, such as the income tax and 
unemployment insurance benefits. Using the modern theory of 
consumption behavior, we identify several channels through 
which the optimal reaction of household consumption plans to 
aggregate income shocks is tempered by the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers.
The insurance channel—through which higher anticipated 
income tax rates reduce the variance of uncertain future after-
tax income—is effective, provided that the precautionary 
motive for saving is important and that individuals understand 
the implications of the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint. The wealth channel—in which current income 
taxes are lower as a result of, say, a recession—is effective if 
individuals expect government purchases (rather than income 
tax rates) to adjust to maintain the government’s intertemporal 
budget constraint. This channel can also be effective if the rate 
used by individuals to discount future income tax hikes exceeds 
the government’s borrowing rate (as in the FRB/US model). 
The liquidity channel—in which lower current income taxes 
relax borrowing or liquidity constraints—is effective to the 
extent that such constraints are in fact binding for a nontrivial 
fraction of the population.
To bring some evidence to bear on these issues, we present 
results from several empirical exercises using postwar U.S. 
data. Using standard time-domain techniques, we estimate 
elasticities of the various federal taxes with respect to their tax 
bases and responses of certain components of federal spending 
to changes in the unemployment rate. Such estimates are useful 
for analysts who forecast federal revenues and spending; the 
estimates also allow high-employment or cyclically adjusted 
federal tax receipts and expenditures to be estimated. Using 
frequency-domain techniques, we confirm that the 
relationships found in the time domain are strong at the 
business-cycle frequencies. Such results suggest the potential 
for the automatic fiscal stabilizers to play a quantitatively 
important role in the economic stabilization process.
However, in one large-scale, macroeconometric model of 
the U.S. economy—FRB/US—the automatic fiscal stabilizers 
are found to play a modest role in damping the short-run effect 
of aggregate demand shocks on real GDP, reducing the 
multiplier by about 10 percent, although they have a somewhat 
larger damping impact (in percentage terms) on personal 
consumption expenditures. Very little stabilization is provided 
in the case of an aggregate supply shock. In light of the findings 
from the FRB/US simulations, perhaps the title and conclusion 
of our paper should be “The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers: 
Quietly and Modestly Doing Their Thing.”Appendix: Empirical Results from the Frequency Domain
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1. For an opposing view, see Atkeson and Phelan (1994).
2. One notable exception is Auerbach and Feenberg (1999).
3. Blinder and Solow (1974) do not evaluate automatic fiscal 
stabilizers under the assumption of rational expectations. In a rational 
expectations macroeconomic model, McCallum and Whitaker (1979) 
establish that automatic stabilizers can be effective at stabilizing 
output; however, like those of Blinder and Solow, their results are not 
based on an explicit set of optimizing models for consumers and 
firms. 
4. The basic Keynesian model result—that the automatic stabilizers, in 
fact, stabilize—obviously does not hold in versions of the model in 
which the aggregate demand multiplier is zero and stabilization is 
unnecessary. For example, the automatic stabilizers are irrelevant 
when there is a completely inelastic aggregate supply of goods (the 
full-employment version of  the model) or flexible exchange rates. In 
these cases, flexible wages, prices, or exchange rates do the stabilizing. 
In addition to possibly being irrelevant, the automatic stabilizers 
may be a destabilizing force. An example involves forward-looking 
expectations (and thus deviates from the basic Keynesian framework). 
If an income tax rate is varied countercyclically (but not completely 
automatically, if Congress must first recognize that a recession is 
under way), employed households may optimally reduce labor supply 
at the start of a recession (in response to an anticipated increase in 
after-tax wages), further reducing output. Similarly, if an investment 
tax credit were varied countercyclically, firms might postpone 
investments at the start of a recession and accelerate them during 
booms, thereby exacerbating cyclical fluctuations.
5. Indeed, it is not clear how best to incorporate (expected) future 
taxes into the basic Keynesian framework; perhaps the present 
discounted value of the tax stream could be included as a component 
of private nonhuman wealth, itself a determinant of consumption 
demand. Alternatively, one could modify the simple textbook model 
to allow for dynamic and forward-looking elements along the lines of 
Blanchard (1981). 
6. Chan (1983) and Christiano (1984) both allow for households to 
invest in a private, risky asset. We abstract from such investment 
opportunities. Also, implicitly households are allowed to borrow and 
lend at the risk-free interest rate,  .
7. A way to motivate this setup is found in Aschauer (1985). In his 
model, utility is a function of effective consumption in period  ,  , 
r
iC *i
defined as  , where   is positive if   and   are 
substitutes. That is, for a given level of effective consumption, an 
additional unit of government spending will induce the individual to 
reduce private consumption by   units. Defining  , 
 since  .  
 corresponds to our assumption  . 
8. For example, if income falls temporarily by $100, personal 
consumption should fall by about $5 (given econometric estimates of 
the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth); with a 20 percent 
income tax rate, taxes and hence government purchases would fall by 
$20. Thus, investment would fall by $75. The decline in investment 
likely will be larger if future income taxes are raised, rather than if 
government purchases are reduced, to maintain a budget balance.
9. The elasticity estimated in FRB/US probably captures discretionary 
changes in the tax code as well as endogenous changes in receipts.
10. When fully rational (rather than VAR) expectations are 
incorporated into the simulations, the model assumes that the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied by altering 
future income tax rates to stabilize the government’s debt-to-GDP ratio.
11. In addition, after-corporate-tax cash flow has a positive impact on 
investment in producers’ durable equipment and on personal 
consumption expenditures (via stock market wealth) in FRB/US. 
However, these channels of influence play only a minor role in the 
subsequent simulation results.
12. Note that there can be a slight tension between the expected federal 
funds rate generated by the VAR system and the “actual” federal funds 
rate resulting under either of the two monetary policy assumptions; 
that is, policy misperceptions are possible, at least in the short run.
13. Note that the table shows increases in the percentage deviation 
from baseline in real PCE; this translates into an increase in the PCE 
“multiplier” from about 0.2 to 0.3.
14. Although we have not explicitly considered non-oil-price supply 
shocks, results reported in Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999) 
suggest that the role of the automatic stabilizers in the face of other 
supply shocks would differ somewhat from those described above. For 
example, in FRB/US, a productivity shock affects supply and demand 
(the latter by altering permanent income) and thus the impact of the 
automatic stabilizers on model multipliers would be intermediate to 
the separate demand and supply shock cases considered above.
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15. The idea is that the sensitivity of the output gap (actual minus 
potential) with respect to an aggregate supply shock is greater the 
stronger the automatic stabilizers are in a simple textbook model of 
aggregate demand and supply. For example, with a negative aggregate 
supply shock that reduces desired output, actual output will also 
decline as prices rise; however, the price rise will be smaller—and 
hence the narrowing of the output gap more limited—the stronger the 
automatic stabilizers are.
16. See the appendix in Cohen (1999) for a review—aimed at the 
practitioner—of the key results of spectral analysis used in this paper 
as well as references to the literature.
17. We utilize PROC SPECTRA from SAS to generate the basic 
spectral densities and squared coherencies. We use kernel estimation 
of the spectrum with a bandwidth parameter of 4. The respective
95 percent confidence bands were programmed by us. On rare 
occasions, the squared coherencies will lie outside the lower 95 percent 
confidence band; this is possible because of the squaring operation.
18. Furthermore, as shown in Cohen (1999), other federal transfer 
programs—such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Food 
Stamps—have low squared coherencies with the unemployment rate 
at business-cycle frequencies, implying that these programs are weak 
automatic stabilizers at best. 
19. The CBO data are based on Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
estimates of GDP before the comprehensive revision, which was 
published in October 1999. Our estimates use the same data.
20. Indeed, this was a problem for deLeeuw et al. (1980), which they 
addressed by using time trends. Our difference approach creates 
stationary series and does not rely on deterministic time trends. That 
said, levels specifications, using cubic-spliced time trends, yield 
similar results for the coefficients on the   terms.
21. Using the annual Statistics of Income (SOI) data on tax liabilities 
implies that we are estimating a liability elasticity. Both the NIPA 
budget estimates and the unified budget record taxes on a payments 
basis. Our estimates may not capture the precise timing of the changes 
in payments being estimated. For example, during a downturn in the 
economy, tax payments may be accelerated relative to liabilities.
22. Simplifying to the case where AGI equals adjusted personal income 
, equation 16 is obtained by taking the total differential of 
the tax function,  —which implicitly allows tax revenues 
GDPGAP
Eagi 1 = ()
TF n y , () =
to respond differently to changes in the number of returns and 
changes in income per return—and dividing the resulting expression 
by the total differential of the aggregate income function, 
, all multiplied by  .
23. The elasticity of each group equals the slope of the line traced out 
by the natural logarithms of average taxes and average income. The 
slope for an AGI group is estimated by calculating the derivative of the 
parabola defined by three points consisting of the group and the 
groups above and below.
24. Some deductions—mortgage interest, for example—may be more 
closely related to permanent income than cyclical income while other 
deductions—such as state and local income taxes—are closely related 
to cyclical income. Thus, our calculations may understate the true 
cyclical marginal tax rate. The lower tax rate for capital gains may also 
unduly reduce the effective cyclical marginal tax rate to the extent that 
realizations do not reflect cyclical factors.
25. The chief problem is that the weights become unstable when the 
gaps are very small. By contrast, our 0.5 estimate is consistent with the 
swings in the gaps—and the weights—from business-cycle peaks to 
troughs throughout the sample period. For example, we estimate that 
the gap in the number of returns swung from -1.0 in 1989 to 1.6 in 
1991, while the gap in the average income per return swung from
-0.5 to 2.0 over the same period. Thus, the changes in the gaps were 
approximately equal. Similar results were obtained across earlier 
business cycles.
26. In addition, there is a small amount collected for veteran’s life 
insurance, workmen’s compensation, CHAMPUS (the military health 
program for dependents), and private employer pension benefits 
(PBGC premiums).
27. The elasticity of federal employee retirement contributions is 
assumed to be zero because there have been no endogenous changes 
in federal employment or pay owing to the business cycle. The income 
elasticity of SMI is approximately zero because Medicare status is 
based largely on age.
28. Our analysis indicates that the distribution of income between 
those above the taxable wage cap and those below the cap is not 
sensitive to the business cycle. We developed two parameters that are 
sufficient to describe the distribution of wages to make OASDI tax 
calculations—the share of wage earners below the cap, and the ratio of 
wages of those above the cap to those below the cap. The former is not 
AGI n*y =A G I T ¤66 The Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers
Endnotes (Continued)
Note 28 continued
correlated with the business cycle; the latter has only a weak 
correlation. Thus, we ignore cyclical sensitivity of the income 
distribution.
29. For example, in 1997  6 percent of the self-employed had income 
exceeding the caps, and they earned 21 percent of total self-employed 
income. Among wage earners, only 5 percent were above the caps, and 
they earned 14 percent of total income.
30. Program specifics are legislated at the state level subject to general 
federal criteria as well as strong incentives to tax at least $7,000.
31. This exercise may also capture legislated changes by state 
governments in response to UI trust fund reserves.
32. This step is identical to the deLeeuw et al. (1980) procedure, which 
has potential econometric problems as the adjustments and potential 
GDP are nominal values in level terms. “Share style” equations 
showed no explanatory power.
33. The elasticity tends to fall during recessions owing to the rise in 
losses.
34. deLeeuw et al. (1980) estimated that the elasticity of the tax code 
declined from 0.08 in 1955 to 0.02 in 1979. We have assumed that it 
has remained at that level.
35. Medicare enrollments are insensitive to business-cycle fluctuations 
because enrollment is based largely on age. OASI enrollments and 
outlays are boosted during recessions because some workers take early 
retirement when faced with poor employment prospects. This factor 
would raise benefit payments by about 0.3 percent for each percentage-
point change in the unemployment rate. However, OASI payments are 
held down by the effects of previous recessions because the additional 
claimants from those recessions receive lower benefits than they would 
have if they had retired at the normal age. Given that the present value 
of the benefit stream is approximately the same for those who take early 
retirement as it is for those who retire at age sixty-five, we have assumed 
that the net cyclical effect for the government is zero.
36. Until the extended benefits program is triggered by high levels of 
unemployment, an increase in the unemployment rate will have little 
effect on these expenditures. For example, in 1982 $2.5 billion was 
spent on extended benefits, but only $0.3 billion was spent in 1991, 
largely because the latter recession was milder.
37. This result appears to be dependent on the states included in the 
sample. The reported result is obtained when the sample is limited to 
the nineteen states that provided the AFDC-UP program 
continuously over the 1975-95 period. When the sample is enlarged to 
include states that were forced to initiate the program in the 1990s, the 
unemployment rate becomes insignificant.
38. The zeroing out of welfare abstracts from the small contingency 
program ($2 billion over five years) for states with high and rising 
unemployment.
39. The rest appears as lower taxes and is captured by our tax elasticity 
estimates.
40. The regressions for the personal income tax indicated that the 
number of nonsingle filers is not sensitive to the business cycle and   
the lion’s share of EIC beneficiaries is nonsingles.
41. The actual elasticity for the expenditure portion may be smaller, as 
the refundable portion (about $24 billion of the $28 billion in 1996) 
would be less heavily weighted in the phase-out region.
42. See Rupp and Stapleton (1995).
43. These calculations ignore any hysteresis that is probably especially 
evident in the DI program, where few leave the rolls. But if the rolls do 
tend to ratchet up over time, it is not clear that the increases owing to 
recessions should be included in cyclical measures.
44. The ultimate effect would be somewhat larger owing to the lagged 
response of these programs.References
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